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Color-Coordinated Families: Race Matching in
Adoption in the United States and Britain
Anjana Bahl*
I. INTRODUCTION
Race matching in adoption refers to the policy of placing children of
a given race with adoptive parents of the same race. Ideally, the
practice attempts to create a racially-similar family that is
indistinguishable from the biological family.' Various groups, such as
the National Association of Black Social Workers, have strongly
defended race matching in adoptions.2 The proponents of race
matching claim that same-race adoptions are necessary in order for
children to develop a positive racial identity.3 In addition, they argue
that racially-dissimilar parents are unable to give a child such an
identity.4
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1. See Elizabeth Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? The Politics of Race
Matching in Adoption, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1163, 1173 (1991) [hereinafter Bartholet,
Politics of Race Matching] (theorizing that what is "natural" in a biological family is
desirable in adoptive families, which she terms "biologism"). Bartholet correctly
argues that we should recognize and respect the ways in which adoption differs from
biological parenting, and structure our laws and policies in a manner that consolidates
the positive potential which the practice of adoption has as a family form. Id. at 1173.
See also ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, FAMILY BONDS: ADOPTION AND THE POLITICS OF PARENTING
93, 111 (1993) [hereinafter BARTHOLET, FAMILY BONDS]. Arguably, although adoption
seems to be an acceptable way of forming a non-biological family, racial matching
practices seem to suggest an attempt to hide the fact that the child is adopted.
2. See infra notes 20-26 and accompanying text. For the most part, black and
minority children are placed with white families; only in very rare cases are white
children not placed with white families. Bartholet, Politics of Race Matching, supra
note 1, at 1175. For this reason, the term "transracial adoption" has sometimes been
used only to refer to the adoption of black children by white families. In this Article the
term is used to refer to the adoption of a child by racially-dissimilar parents. See also
OWEN GILL & BARBARA JACKSON, ADOPTION AND RACE: BLACK, ASIAN AND MIXED RACE
CHILDREN IN WHITE FAMILIES 1 (1983) [hereinafter GILL & JACKSON, ADOPTION & RACE]
(defining the term "transracial adoption").
3. See infra notes 76-96 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
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Several practical problems arise, however, when adoption agencies
and local authorities pursue race-matching policies. First, there are
significantly more white parents wishing to adopt than there are white
children awaiting placement, and the black children waiting to be
adopted outnumber the available adoptive black families. Second,
same-race adoption does not seem to consider the plight of biracial and
multiracial children, for whom an ideal "match" seems impossible.
Most importantly, race-matching practices inevitably hinder the best
interests of adoptees."
Race matching also presents legal problems. In the United States,
the exercise of racial matching is particularly curious given that in most
areas of community life, race is a totally impermissible factor in
classification.8 The unconstitutionality of certain race classifications,
whether in the context of prohibiting interracial marriages or
segregation in the public school system,9 suggests that significant
efforts have been made to narrow the racial divide. Thus, permitting
racial separatism in the adoption context seems an aberrant practice.
Arguably, it indicates that despite the legislative attempts to be
colorblind, there still remains a deep-seated hostility toward interracial
families and relationships. Although the constitutional history and
concomitant concerns of Britain and the United States are different, the
social and political issues that trouble race relations, and thus
5. 136 CONG. REC. E2078-01 (June 21, 1990). Representative George Miller of
California introduced a report of the Select Committee on Children, Youth and Families
to the legislature, entitled No Place To Call Home: Discarded Children in America. Id. at
E2079. The Report states that minority children in foster care are disproportionately
represented: in 1988, approximately 46% of children in foster care were minority
children, which was more than twice the number of minority children in the population.
Id. Among the reasons given for this disparity was the increase in homeless persons,
AIDS, poverty and drug abuse. These are factors that have particularly affected black
families and minority communities and have displaced the children in both those
groups. Hearing on the Child Abuse Prevention, Adoption and Family Services Act,
Serial No. 102-96, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 263, 265 (1992). Reports of child abuse and
neglect have tripled since 1980 and even though most of the "child-victims" are white,
black children are disproportionately represented. See The Cost of Crack: Foster Care,
ECONOMIST, May 14, 1994, at 33. See also Twila L. Perry, Race and Child-Placement:
The Best Interests Test and the Cost of Discretion, 29 J. FAM. L. 51, 52 (1991)
(discussing the increased interest in transracial adoption due to the larger number of
minority children being displaced from their homes because of growing social
problems).
6. See infra notes 101-10 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 62-65 and accompanying text; see generally Part III.A.
8. Bartholet, Politics of Race Matching, supra note 1, at 1226.
9. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that racial segregation
in public schools is unconstitutional and ordering their integration).
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transracial adoptions, are quite similar.'0 The adoption system seems
to serve as a forum for the articulation of historic grievances and
greater racial polarization."
The purpose of this Article is to consider whether racial-matching
practices that are undertaken by adoption agencies, local authorities,
and the courts are in a child's best interests.' 2 Reviewing the effects of
those policies and the practice of transracial adoption, and assessing
their competing strengths and weaknesses within the best interests
framework, this Article will determine whether a racially-neutral
system, in which race is eliminated as a factor in the placement
process, is preferable to racial-matching policies.
Accordingly, this Article first considers arguments in favor of both
race matching and transracial adoption policies. 3 Next, this Article
refutes traditional social arguments in favor of race-matching policies
and illustrates the difficulty in reconciling race-matching policies and
the best interests of the child.' 4 This Article then analyzes the legal
challenges to racial matching in both the United States and Britain."
Finally, this Article concludes that transracial adoptions offer children
the opportunity to live in stable, permanent family environments, the
true objective of the adoption process. 6
II. THE COMPETING ARGUMENTS
A. The Case For Race
During the 1960s, there was a noticeable change 7 in the attitude
toward transracial adoptions in the United States. The number of
children adopted increased, perhaps aided by the preference for
international adoptions in the aftermath of the Korean War.' 8 Further,
10. See infra Part II.
11. See infra Part VI.
12. See infra Part III.
13. See infra Part II.
14. See infra Part III.
15. See infra Parts IV and V.
16. See infra Part VI.
17. Prior to this there were very strong legal and social barriers to transracial
adoption. Bartholet, Politics of Race Matching, supra note 1, at 1176. Adoption
experts state that racial matching was practiced because a physical resemblance would
facilitate identification between parents and adopted children. RUTH G. McRoY & Louis
A. ZURCHER, TRANSRACIAL AND INRACIAL ADOPTEES: THE ADOLESCENT YEARS 4(1983).
18. After the war, South Korea permitted the adoption of abandoned and orphaned
children. Many of them were mixed race children, fathered by black American soldiers
stationed in Korea. Bartholet, Politics of Race Matching, supra note 1, at 1178. This
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the Civil Rights movement in that decade drew attention to the
condition of minority children in ineffectual foster care programs and
thus encouraged transracial placements. "This movement's
integrationist ideology made transracial adoption a sympathetic idea to
many adoption workers and prospective parents."' 9
Nevertheless, the National Association of Black Social Workers
("NABSW") adopted a hostile approach to the practice.2" The
organization's fundamental position has always been that black
children need to be raised by black families in order to develop a
positive racial identity.2' In short, the association believes that only
black parents can teach black children the skills to cope with a racist
society. Further, the NABSW has stated that transracial placements
threaten black culture and the black community, and are a "blatant form
of race and cultural genocide., 22 Its consistent criticism has arguably
been the most influential factor against transracial adoption and has
resulted in the formation of racially and ethnically mixed adoptive families in the United
States. Id. See also Joan Mahoney, The Black Baby Doll: Transracial Adoption and
Cultural Preservation, 59 UMKC L. REV. 487, 488 (1991). For a concise summary and
historical overview of transracial adoption, see Arnold R. Silverman & William
Feigelman, Adjustment In Interracial Adoptees: An Overview, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
ADOPTION 187, 187-89 (Brodzinsky and Schechter eds., 1990).
19. Bartholet, Politics of Race Matching, supra note 1, at 1178. Margaret Howard
has identified a variety of factors which contributed to the increase in transracial
placements in the United States: (i) a greater number of children entered the child-
placement system due to the increased awareness and reporting of child abuse; (ii) the
weaknesses of the foster care system which became increasingly obvious; (iii) data
which highlighted the effects of "maternal deprivation" that resulted from the
institutional care that infants were subjected to (foster care was thus considered
preferable to institutional care, and an adoptive, permanent placement as the most
attractive option); (iv) a considerable reduction in the number of minority homes in
contrast to the number of available minority children; (v) social workers abated the
practice of race matching; (vi) a paucity of minority homes given the number of
available minority children; and (vii) a greater acceptance of racial integration, which
made white parents more willing to adopt black children. Margaret Howard, Transracial
Adoption: Analysis of the Best Interests Standard, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 503, 505-14
(1984).
20. RITA J. SIMON & HOWARD ALTSTEIN, TRANSRACIAL ADOPTION 45, 50-52 (1977),
[hereinafter SIMON & ALTSTEIN, TRANSRACIAL ADOPTION] (citing a position paper of the
National Association of Black Social Workers). See also id. at 44-50 (reviewing the
"Antitransracial Adoption Movement"); JOYCE A. LADNER, MIXED FAMILIES: ADOPTING
ACROSS RACIAL BOUNDARIES 74-76 (1977) (discussing the NABSW's views on
transracial adoption). For a more moderate approach to the practice of transracial
adoption, see Leon Chestang, The Dilemma of Biracial Adoption, 17 Soc. WORK 100
(1972).
2 1. See Bartholet, Politics of Race Matching, supra note 1, at 1195.
22. RITA J. SIMON, HOWARD ALTSTEIN & MARYGOLD S. MELLI, THE CASE FOR
TRANSRACIAL ADOPTION 40 (1994) [hereinafter SIMON, ALTSTEIN & MELLI] (citing an
excerpt from the testimony given by William T. Merritt, President of the NABSW, at the
Senate Hearings before the Committee on Labor and Human Resources, June 25, 1985).
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significantly affected the practice.23 The number of transracial
placements diminished from 2574 in 1971 to 831 in 1975.24 A decade
later, the NABSW still maintained that black children must not, under
any circumstances, be placed with white families.25 The president of
the NABSW has stated:
The lateral transfer of our children to white families is not in our
best interest. Having white families raise our children to be
white is at least a hostile gesture toward us as a people and at
best the ultimate gesture of disrespect for our heritage as
African people .... It is their aim to raise Black children with
white minds. . . .We are on the right side of the transracial
adoption issue. Our children are our future.26
Statistics indicating a trend of favoring transracial placements
appeared later in Britain than in the United States. The numbers in
Britain increased from the mid-1960s until the early to mid-1970s,
corresponding to the decrease in the number of available white
babies.2 1 "Indeed, one of the central criticisms related to transracial
adoption is that it was only when the supply of healthy white babies
for adoption had failed that black babies were seen to be suitable for
adoption ....28
However, in the early 1980s, the practice of transracial adoption
was attacked in Britain, corresponding to the strong arguments that
23. Simon and Altstein have commented that:
[Transracial adoption] was not halted because data indicated that it was a
failure, that adoptees and/or their adoptive families suffered any damaging
social or psychological effects. It was not stopped because transracial
adoptees were experiencing racial confusion or negative self-images. It did not
end because there were no longer any non-white children in foster care or in
institutions requiring permanent placements. It was not eradicated because the
supply of families willing and able to adopt a child of another race was
exhausted. Transracial adoption died because child welfare agencies no longer
saw it as politically expedient, even though none of the 50 states recognizes
race as a sufficient factor in denying an adoption.
RITA J. SIMON & HOWARD ALTSTEtN, TRANSRACIAL ADOPTEES AND THEIR FAMILIES: A STUDY
OF IDENTITY AND COMMITMENT 141 (1987) [hereinafter SIMON & ALTSTEIN, TRANSRACIAL
ADOPrEES] (emphasis added).
24. Id. at 5.
25. Bartholet, Politics of Race Matching, supra note 1, at 1182 n.43, 1195 (citing
NABSW, PRESERVING BLACK FAMILIES: RESEARCH AND ACTION BEYOND THE RHETORIC 49
(1986)) (emphasis added).
26. Kim Forde-Mazrui, Black Identity and Child Placement: The Best Interests of
Black and Biracial Children, 92 MICH. L. REV. 925, 961 n.205 (1994) (quoting Morris
F.X. Jeff, Jr., President's Message, NAT'L ASS'N BLACK SOC. WORKERS NEWSLETTER,
Spring 1988, at 1-2).
27. GILL & JACKSON, ADOPTION & RACE, supra note 2, at 2.
28. Id.
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had become influential in the United States.29 Moreover, in Britain, a
considerable number of black children remain in out-of-home care
because of the complete prohibition that many local authorities impose
against the placement of black or mixed-race children with Caucasian
parents.30 In 1983, the Association of Black Social Workers and
Allied Professionals (ABSWAP) was established in Britain. Similar to
the NABSW in the United States, it turned to that organization for
advice, after which it targeted social workers with proposed
guidelines.3' The British Agencies for Adoption and Fostering
(BAAF) established the Black Perspectives Advisory Committee and
also expressed a similarly forceful view that black children should not
be placed with white parents.32 The BAAF has stated:
Historically black people have been victims of racism for
centuries. This has manifested and continues to manifest itself
in many forms. Racism permeates all areas of British society...
Black children therefore require the survival skills necessary to
develop a positive racial identity. This will enable them to deal
with the racism within our predominantly white society.33
Some critics of transracial adoption have added that the traditional
criteria for prospective adoptive families, which focus on economic
stability, marriage, and middle-class values, operate to disqualify
blacks and other disadvantaged ethnic groups. Black professionals
argue that there is institutional racism in white welfare agencies that are
staffed primarily by white social workers." They state that whenever
black child welfare agencies have made an effort to identify and
recommend families, fairly large numbers of black children have been
placed in black adoptive homes.36
Others have reasoned that the inconsistency between the apparent
wish to adopt by black families and the shortfall in acceptable black
29. Peter Hayes, The Ideological Attack on Transracial Adoption in the USA and
Britain, 9 INT'L. J.L. & FAM. 1, 3 (1995).
30. Christopher Bagley, Transracial Adoption in Britain: A Follow-Up Study, with
Policy Considerations, 72 CHILD WELFARE 285, 295 (1993) [hereinafter Bagley,
Transracial Adoption in Britain]. Bagley states that "some local authority practice may
be based on a naive, absurd antiracist policy, which assumes that keeping black children
separated from white families will somehow serve their interests, or protect them from
racism." Id. at 296.
3 1. Hayes, supra note 29, at 3.
32. Id. See also Re N (A Minor) (Adoption) [1990] 1 FLR 58, 62 (quoting summary to
a practice note).
33. Id.
34. SIMON, ALTSTEIN & MELLI, supra note 22, at 42.
35. Id. at 43-44.
36. SIMON & ALTSTEIN, TRANSRACIAL ADOPTEES, supra note 23, at 8.
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homes can be explained as follows: (a) child welfare agencies have
not utilized effective channels such as the black press and churches
when recruiting families; (b) blacks have historically been wary of
public agencies and have, for the most part, avoided contact with them;
and (c) many blacks have felt that because they live in poorer areas,
they are unlikely to be accepted, even if they largely satisfy the other
qualifying criteria.37 Some argue, therefore, that the practice of
transracial adoption would be unnecessary if appropriate and equitable
efforts were made to recruit families from black and minority
communities and if the deep-seated racist perspective that questions
their parenting abilities were dispelled. 8
B. The Argument for Transracial Placements
"In contrast to the evidence on which the case for transracial
adoption rests, the case against transracial placements is built primarily
on ideology and rhetoric."39 Racial-matching policies delay the
permanent placement of a child. They also result in denying foster
parents the opportunity to adopt a racially-different child, even though
their parenting has been excellent and the child is attached to them and
emotionally well adjusted. In the United States, black children
comprise a disproportionately high number of children in need of
homes, and black children wait twice as long as white children for
permanent homes. 4° Many agencies have mandatory policies against
37. Id. at 9. Gill and Jackson also provide a similar explanation about black families
in Britain. GILL & JACKSON, ADOPTION & RACE, supra note 2, at 3. They further state that
the Asian and West Indian communities in Britain may also have been discouraged by
the alien nature of formal adoption procedures. Id.
3 8. See generally LEORA NEAL & AL STUMPH, TRANSRACIAL ADOPTIVE PARENTING: A
BLACK/WHITE COMMUNITY ISSUE (1993). Neal & Stumph argue that the child care system
in the United States serves black children inadequately and mirrors the well established
racism and bureaucracy endemic in the system. Id. at 2.
There is also an interest in dispelling the public perception of black families as being
inadequate and unwilling to care for black children in need. Perry, supra note 5, at 117.
See also SIMON, ALTSTEIN & MELLI, supra note 22, at 46-47 (noting the ten-point
Minority Placement Position Statement issued by the North American Council on
Adoptable Children, favoring same-race placements for black, Hispanic, and Native
American children).
39. SIMON, ALTSTEIN & MELLI, supra note 22, at 39 (emphasis in original).
40. Bartholet, Politics of Race Matching, supra note 1, at 1187. Bartholet also
states:
The socio-economic disadvantages of blacks as a group explain, to a
significant degree, both the fact that disproportionate numbers of black
children are living in out-of-home placements, and the fact that limited
numbers of black families are available to adopt them. It is, for the most part,
people living in relatively stable social and economic situations who have
sought the opportunity to parent through adoption.
1996]
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transracial placements, even though there are a large number of parents
waiting to adopt." "While the months and years go by the children are
pushed deeper into the hard-to-place category, as they get older and
accumulate what are often damaging experiences in foster care. Delay
thus puts the child at risk of yet more delay and, ultimately, the denial
of placement altogether. 42 In Britain, it is argued that a transracial
foster or adoptive placement is far preferable to long periods spent in
residential care.43 The research confirms that adoption has better
results for the children than institutionalized or residential care.44
Further, although some radical black organizations in Britain have
stated that "the black community" is against transracial adoption, it is
unclear whether those groups actually speak for the black community.
There is also no clarity as to what the average member of the black
community in Britain thinks about transracial adoption.45 It is thus
argued that organizations in both the United States and Britain that are
opposed to transracial adoption have often used simplistic assumptions
to validate their claim of speaking for the community, when in reality,
they impose their views on the community.46
Id. at 1203 n.106.
41. Id. at 1195. See also SIMON, ALTSTEIN & MELLI, supra note 22, at 4-8, 21-22.
42. Bartholet, Politics of Race Matching, supra note 1, at 1204. See also SILVERMAN
& FEIGELMAN, supra note 18, at 198.
43. CHRISTOPHER BAGLEY, INTERNATIONAL AND TRANSRACIAL ADOPTIONS: A MENTAL
HEALTH PERSPECTIVE 260 (1993) [hereinafter BAGLEY, INTERNATIONAL AND TRANSRACIAL
ADOPTIONS].
44. Id. It is further stated that even though a same-race placement might be
desirable, many white families, with careful screening and support, are able to provide
the stability, care, and sense of identity relevant in a transracial placement. Id.
45. Id. at 256. In 1979, 100 families in the London Borough of Merton were
surveyed to ascertain their response to the acceptance of transracial adoption. Id. at 257.
Seventy-one percent of them totally accepted the idea. Id. at 258. They nevertheless
expressed their fears about the possible rejection and isolation from the black
community for black children brought up in white homes. Id. However, 85% of
respondents preferred a black child to be raised in a white adoptive home as opposed to
foster care or an institution. Id. In 1989, a similar study to that undertaken in 1979 was
conducted in South London; eleven of the respondents interviewed in 1989 were children
of individuals interviewed in. the 1979 study. Id. at 259. About one-third of the black
respondents were strongly against the idea of transracial adoptions, but almost half of
the respondents were quite accepting of the practice. Id.
46. Hayes, supra note 29, at 15.
[T~he viability of TRA [transracial adoption] does not depend upon the
majority and minority opinions within ethnically defined communities but
only on there being sufficient diversity of views and attitudes among members
of society for someone who is transracially adopted to be able to integrate
into the community in which they grow up, and in which they choose to live.
Id. at 16.
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It is thus submitted that agency policies or authorities which keep
children in institutions, with foster families, or move them from home
to home to avoid a transracial placement are damaging to children and
cannot be supported. For example, some agencies in the United States
have "holding periods," which vary in duration, before a transracial
placement is made; others have time-specific policies, but with vague
guidelines, before permitting a transracial adoption.47 These are
practices that can only harm children awaiting permanent homes.
There are also long delays in legally freeing a child for adoption. In
the United States and Britain, court procedures to terminate the rights
of biological parents can be lengthy. Specifically, in the United States
the process may take two to four years.48 Thus, when adoption
workers postpone the steps for adoption because a same-race
placement cannot be made, the delay is compounded and is ultimately
detrimental to the child. "Even the best foster placement remains
psychologically temporary in the minds of all concerned.
4 9
Proponents of transracial adoptions also argue that the criteria
applied to screen parents in a mandatory race-matching process is
significantly different for prospective white and black adoptive
parents.5 ° For example, efforts to enlarge the pool of black parents
have included considering older people in their fifties and sixties,
single persons, and those on welfare as potential parents - in
essence, the type of person routinely excluded from the pool of white
parents or, at best, given very low priority.5 Moreover, government
subsidies, which may be misused by those in dire financial need, are
provided as an incentive to single persons and minorities to encourage
them to adopt minority children, even though they may have little
interest in the adopted child.5 2 It is, therefore, stated that the racial
factor helps include and give priority to those at the bottom of the black
list over those on the white list to ensure that a same-race placement is
47. Bartholet, Politics of Race Matching, supra note 1, at 1193-94.
48. Id. at 1194 n.77.
49. SIMON & ALTSTEIN, TRANSRACIAL ADOITEES, supra note 23, at 142.
50. Hayes, supra note 29, at 3-4.
5 1. Bartholet, Politics of Race Matching, supra note 1, at 1199. Bartholet states that
"[a]s a result, the pool of black adoptive parents [in the United States] looks very
different in socio-economic terms from the pool of white parents. Black adoptive
parents are significantly older, poorer, and more likely to be single than their white
adoptive counterparts." Id. at 1199-200.
52. Id. at 1206 n. 117. Conversely, some argue that providing financial incentives
would encourage those black and minority families who wished to adopt, but are
economically unable, to take part in the adoption process. Perry, supra note 5, at 126
n. 235.
1996]
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made." Arguably, the efforts should be directed toward assessing
those prospective parents, despite their skin color, who best satisfy the
parental fitness criteria, instead of race matching at any cost.'
C. The Compromise Position
Some professionals in this area argue that the initial efforts should
be directed towards placing children with same-race families." If a
suitable placement is unavailable, then applications for transracial
adoptions should be considered.56 Other professionals suggest that
transracial placements, albeit a second choice to a same-race
placement, are preferable to long-term institutional care and for
difficult placements such as older or disabled black and minority
children.
Professor Twila L. Perry argues that only "in the initial placement of
a child for adoption," where two or more adoptive families are
available, should race be given considerable weight. 8 At this stage
there is no danger of disruption to the child or of severing ties with,
quite often, the only family the child has ever known. Nevertheless,
Professor Perry states that even though the initial placement of the
child might be the only situation in which it is at all appropriate to
consider race, ironically, it is a setting that is least likely to exist: very
few black children in need of adoption will be in a position where two
families of different races will be vying for the placement. 59
Moreover, there is a danger that adoption agencies and authorities will
misuse this allowance and delay placements, yet again, in search of an
"ideal" match. A child should not be denied the continuity and the
53. Bartholet, Politics of Race Matching, supra note 1, at 1206. See also Hayes,
supra note 29, at 3-4.
54. It has also been stated that the quality of parenting is more important than
whether a child has been transracially adopted or placed with a same-race family.
McROY & ZURCHER, supra note 17, at 138.
55. See, e.g., SIMON & ALTSTEIN, TRANSRACIAL ADOPTEES, supra note 23, at 142
("clearly agency efforts should be initially directed at locating permanent inracial
placements for children").
56. SIMON & ALTSTEIN, TRANSRACIAL ADOPTEES, supra note 23, at 142.
57. James S. Bowen, Cultural Convergences and Divergences: The Nexus Between
Putative Afro-American Family Values and the Best Interests of the Child, 26 J. FAM. L.
487, 511 (1987-88).
58. Perry, supra note 5, at 109 (emphasis added).
59. Id. at 110 n.200. Although Perry states that the NABSW adopts too extreme a
position by opting for institutional life for a child when a permanent non-black
placement is available, or by severing existing "family" ties to secure a same-race
placement, she advocates that, where possible, black children should be placed in black
homes. Id. at 113-14. See also Mahoney, supra note 18, at 499.
[Vol. 28
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stability of a permanent home because racial barriers have been erected
and, indeed, should have the right6° to be an integral part of a family.
6
'
III. IN WHOSE BEST INTERESTS?
The child's best interest is meant to be the primary concern of all
parties in adoption proceedings.62 In essence, the test includes
considering and weighing the various competing factors in any given
case before making a decision that will promote the welfare of the
child.63 This Section will assess the race-matching argument by taking
a closer look at the arguments against transracial adoptions. 64 In light
of this examination, this Section will look at the best interest standard
and whether race matching can meet this standard.65
A. Is Transracial Adoption "Cultural Genocide ".
1. The Perceived Threats
Arguably, there are two separate issues in transracial placements: (a)
the threat to the continuity of black and other minority groups as ethnic
groups; and (b) the effect on the child who perhaps loses her cultural
identity by not securing a same-race placement.67 What is unclear,
60. See generally United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989),
BLACKSTONE'S INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS DOCUMENTS 102 (1st ed. 1995). The
Preamble states: "Recognizing that the child, for the full and harmonious development
of his or her personality, should grow up in a family environment, in an atmosphere of
happiness, love and understanding .... " Id. at 103. It is also argued that removing race
as a factor in adoption proceedings might provide each child with his "birthright" - the
opportunity to be part of a loving family. See Shari O'Brien, Race in Adoption
Proceedings: The Pernicious Factor, 21 TULSA L.J. 485, 498 (1986).
61. Simon and Altstein, however, suggest that some basic questions in this area still
await answers. "For example, does a child have the right to be adopted, or is it a
privilege bestowed on him or her by the courts?" SIMON & ALTSTEIN, TRANSRACIAL
ADOPTION, supra note 20, at 21. See generally Michael King & Judith Trowell,
Responding to Children's Needs: An Issue of Law? in A READER ON FAMILY LAW 311
(John Eekelaar & Mavis Maclean eds., 1994).
62. Howard, supra note 19, at 503-04 (discussing some of the inherent difficulties in
the best interest standard). See infra notes 121-30 and accompanying text.
63. See infra notes 121-30 and accompanying text.
64. See infra Part III.A.
65. See infra Part III.B.
66. Forde-Mazrui, supra note 26, at 959 (noting the NABSW has described transracial
adoption as cultural genocide). Further, Bowen argues that although transracial adoption
may not have started as a "diabolical scheme," it has "diabolical consequences" for the
black family. Bowen, supra note 57, at 528-29. He states that blacks need not wait to
be threatened with "extinction" before retaliating against endangering practices like
transracial placement. Id. at 529.
67. Howard, supra note 19, at 532 n.147.
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however, is why transracial adoption is viewed as an invariable threat
to ethnic continuity. The number of children placed transracially is not
significant enough to raise concerns about cultural extinction. 68 In
fact, a number of transracial placements in the United States have
involved biracial or multiracial children 69 - those whose purely
"black" identity in any event must be questioned.7' Native-Americans,
by contrast, have been threatened as a group, as a critical number of
Indian children have been placed outside that community.7' Further, it
is argued that there is great unity among the Native-American people
against transracial placement. 2  That is not the case in the black
communities, either in the United States or in Britain. These
communities, which are diverse, disagree on important political and
social issues, and are divided along geographical and class lines.
Thus, "[bilack people do not comprise a discrete culture. 73 They
68. There are no clear figures on the number of transracial adoptions. Silverman and
Feigelman state that a "modest guess" of the number of black-white domestic placements
in the United States would range between 1000 and 2000 annually. Silverman &
Feigelman, supra note 18, at 189. In Britain, it is argued that the black family's
position has changed in that there is a "trend towards the embourgoisiment of the black
family" as their socio-economic position has improved. BAGLEY, INTERNATIONAL AND
TRANSRACIAL ADOPTIONS, supra note 43, at 248. Therefore, it is stated that not only are
black families in Britain releasing fewer children, but stable, affluent black families are
also in a position to assume the roles of foster and adoptive parents. Id. Mahoney
argues that children from racially-different backgrounds can bring a new dimension to
the family. Mahoney, supra note 18, at 501. Their culture is not necessarily lost, but
can become a part of their adopted parent's culture. Id. See also SIMON, ALTSTEIN &
MELLI, supra note 22, at 1-8 (stating that from 1968-1975, approximately 12,000 black
children were placed with white families).
69. Bartholet, Politics of Race Matching, supra note 1, at 1175 n.14.
70. See infra notes 101-10 and accompanying text.
71. Howard, supra note 19, at 530-33. See also infra notes 72, 140-47, and
accompanying text. Nevertheless, Bowen argues that the position of Afro-American
families in the United States is similar to that of Native-Americans:
Both groups have suffered a history of extreme segregation, severe
discrimination and tremendous oppression in America; both have been
considered discrete and insular racial minorities; both have been viewed as,
and in fact have been, politically powerless vis-a-vis the dominant white
majority .... As a result of these discriminations, at least in part, both groups
have experienced family breakdown in the modern era. This breakdown has
caused children of both groups to be placed with persons not of their own
racial background.
Bowen, supra note 57, at 522-23 n.185 (citations omitted).
72. Hayes, however, argues that it is somewhat artificial to claim that the Native-
American community is unanimously against transracial adoption because the term
"community" itself is ill-defined; it is thus difficult to assess if one or more groups
speak for the entire community. Hayes, supra note 29, at 14-15.
73. Forde-Mazrui, supra note 26, at 962. The black community does not comprise a
cohesive group with an identifiable leadership or distinguishable interests. Id. She
further argues that the existence of diverse attitudes among black people towards black
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cannot be culturally distinguished as having their own religion,
language, or exclusive ethnic practices.74 Thus, because "skin color is
separate from cultural affiliation, a black or biracial child placed in a
white home can learn the culture of her white parents while
maintaining a realistic and healthy view toward her racial identity.""
2. Racial Identity
It is the NABSW's position, and the position of those opposed to
transracial adoption, that only black parents are able to instill a sense of
racial identity in black children. Nevertheless, several empirical
studies have confirmed the success of transracial adoptions,
concluding that the children adjust to their new family as well as those
placed with a same-race family.76 Further, a transracial placement
does not necessarily impede the development of a child's racial identity
and self-esteem.77 Although it is assumed that black children brought
up by Caucasian families will have problems with their ethnic self-
esteem, paradoxically, many black children brought up in black
families face the same obstacles.7' Thus, black and mixed-race
identity is inevitable when the common characteristic in a community is a physical
attribute, as opposed to a religion, a political forum, or other interests. Id. at 964. See
supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text; see also notes 81-82, infra, and
accompanying text.
74. Forde-Mazrui, supra note 26, at 962.
75. Id. at 964. Hayes correctly argues that opponents of transracial adoption
wrongly consider a person's culture and heritage to be the same as their biological make-
up, in that it is argued that just as genes determine a person's physical appearance,
culture and heritage comprise an inherent and vital aspect of a person, as opposed to
being an aspect that is developed and somewhat conventional. Hayes, supra note 29, at
7. See also Mahoney, supra note 18, at 501.
76. See, e.g., Silverman & Feigelman, supra note 18, at 198 (reporting favorable
findings of comparative study of transracial adoption).
77. In a study done by McRoy and Zurcher in Texas, Kansas, and Minnesota of 60
black children, 30 adopted by black parents and 30 adopted by white parents, there was,
overall, no difference in the adjustment of the two groups on standardized mental health
scales. McRoY & ZURCHER, supra note 17, at 18. The black children in white families
identified themselves as "black" considerably more often than the children adopted by
black families. Id. at 129. The latter made "No Reference To Race." Id. Further, both
the black same-race adoptees and the transracial adoptees had similar self-esteem scores.
Id. at 118. See also BAGLEY, INTERNATIONAL AND TRANSRACIAL ADOPTIONS, supra note
43, at 79.
78. Bagley, Transracial Adoption in Britain, supra note 30, at 287-88. In several
"projective" tests, for example, using photographs of Caucasian and black people, and
black and white colors and figures, black children both in Britain and the United States
have been inclined to devalue black people and blackness, and have indicated a
preference for white figures to the extent of negating and occasionally denigrating their
own blackness. Id. at 288. However, this has improved, and black children have since
evaluated "self-characteristics" more positively. Id. In 1987, 20% of the black
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
children adopted by Caucasian parents may have different levels of
racial identity and may evaluate black people in a similar or possibly
more positive way than black children raised in same-race families.79
A British study of 114 adopted and non-adopted children supports
this contention.8 0 In the study, thirty black or mixed-race children
adopted by Caucasian parents were compared with thirty Caucasian
children adopted by same-race parents, thirty black and mixed-race
children in foster or group care who were not adopted, and twenty-
four children in a comparison group comprised from school sources.
The evaluation of the black and mixed-race adopted children, at the
time between six and eight years of age, resulted, in general, in good
psychological outcomes in reference to a number of standard measures
of adjustment."'
Twelve years later, the study located twenty-seven of the thirty
black and mixed-race children adopted by Caucasian parents, and
twenty-five of the thirty Caucasian children adopted by same-race
families. The children were, on average, nineteen years of age. In
terms of adjustment and identity, the results for both groups, for the
most part, were excellent.8 2 In both groups, approximately ten percent
had adjustment difficulties. 3 The study thus indicated, as others have,
that the multicultural identity a transracial adoptee forms is not
Jamaican children assessed in Toronto identified with white children, compared with
40% of black Jamaican children studied in Britain in 1976 and 53% of African-American
children evaluated in 1976 using the same "projective" tests. Id. (citations omitted).
79. Id. Simon and Altstein have reported that:
[I]t appears that black children reared in the special setting of multiracial
families do not acquire the ambivalence toward their own race reported in all
other studies involving young black children. Our results also show that
white children do not consistently prefer white to other groups, and that there
are no significant differences in the racial attitudes of any of the categories of
children. Our findings do not offer any evidence that black children reared by
white parents acquire a preference for black over white. They show only that
black children perceive themselves as black as accurately as white children
perceive themselves as white.
SIMON & ALTSTEIN, TRANSRACIAL ADOPTION, supra note 20, at 158.
80. Bagley, Transracial Adoption in Britain, supra note 30, at 289-96.
8 1. Id. at 289. Some of the Caucasian parents, however, had few black friends and
were either not able to or were unwilling to inculcate a sense of black pride and
consciousness in their children. Id. See also supra notes 76-77, and accompanying
text.
82. Bagley, Transracial Adoption in Britain, supra note 30, at 292. The black and
mixed-race adoptees, both male and female, had close Caucasian friends. Id. However
"41% of the black adoptees ha[d] a best girlfriend/boyfriend who [was] black, mixed-
race, Chinese, or Indian, compared with 24% of the Caucasian adoptees." Id. Neither
group of adoptees had any difficulty "in finding friends of either sex." Id. at 293.
83. Id.
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prejudicial to the child's development or adaptation. On the contrary,
the children seemed well-positioned to be part of a multiracial
84society.
Further, proponents of racial-matching policies may have adopted a
rather simplistic approach to the issues of racial and ethnic identity.
These are terms which have no precise definition. 5 Some argue that
"[w]hether adopted by parents of their own or another race, adoptees
often find it difficult to establish a sense of identity. 86 For example,
does racial identity mean that a child considers herself a black person,
or that she identifies with black culture? 87 The two issues may (but not
must) be interrelated. Thus "a child could feel good about being Black
without identifying with Black culture. 88 There is no dispute that a
strong ethnic and cultural identity provides support, as one can draw
strength and encouragement from that community. Further, there is no
doubt that ethnic diversity in society is intrinsically valuable. But in
the context of any ethnic community, as indeed with any group, it is
incorrect to state that there is just one culture with the same cohesive
values that all families relate to and identify with. Further, a "color-
blind" approach, which advocates that people should be treated as
individuals irrespective of their color, does not contend that there are
no cultural differences between people. In essence, it is simply that
84. Id. at 294.
85. Howard also states that it is impossible to define terms such as "successful"
transracial placements, "cultural identity," and to measure what has been accomplished.
Thus she states that any researcher analyzing transracial adoption must face these
difficulties, and arguably all the data in this area can be criticized on those grounds.
Nevertheless, she argues that it is "the only data we have ... and must be relied on for
whatever they are worth." Howard, supra note 19, at 534 n.155 (citations omitted).
Hayes, however, argues that researchers analyzing the practice of transracial adoption
have at times distorted research materials and positive results, and even come to
conclusions that contradict their research findings. Hayes, supra note 29, at 5-6. See
also Penny R. Johnson et al., Transracial Adoption and the Development of Black
Identity at Age Eight, 66 CHILD WELFARE 45 (1987). The authors analyzed issues such as
racial identity, the child's adjustment, and related factors. Id. at 46-47. Two different
interpretations of the same research data were offered. Id. at 52-54. The first stated that
transracial adoptions are working; the second expressed concerns about the development
of racial identity and the acceptance of racial differences. Id.
86. In re R.M.G., 454 A.2d 776, 787 (D.C. 1982) (emphasis added).
87. Forde-Mazrui, supra note 26, at 946 n.128.
88. Id. at 947. Silverman and Feigelman state that upon reviewing the research in
this area, they find an absence of any link between levels of racial identification and
self-esteem. Silverman & Feigelman, supra note 18, at 197. Thus, a black child who is
transracially adopted might develop a positive sense of identity without exclusively
identifying with the black community. Id.
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"no-one is naturally predestined to conform to any particular culture,
nor should they be forced to do so. ' '89
Some observers state that there is no evidence that black parents
better inculcate a sense of racial and cultural pride in black children
than do white parents. 90 "It also seems clear that there are Black adults
who have not been able to successfully handle the disadvantages of
race in their own lives and who therefore might not be such effective
teachers."9' Thus it is stated that any policy or practice "that engages
in racial steering on the basis of a hunch that certain people, because of
their race, will know better than others how to raise a child" should be
rejected. 92
It is further argued that there is no credible, empirical evidence to
substantiate the proposition that, all things being equal, adults of the
same race will be better positioned to raise a child than parents of a
different race.93 "[T]here exists no consensus on what constitutes
racially-correct parenting." 94
Others reason that a white parent's denial of ethnic inferiority may
be more credible because it is less self-serving. 95 If, in same-race
families (biological or adoptive), the level of racial and ethnic identity
developed in children is not monitored, why is it imperative, almost a
qualifying standard, in transracial placements? 96 The best interests test
89. Hayes, supra note 29, at 7.
90. Bartholet, Politics of Race Matching, supra note 1, at 1220. Studies indicate that
there is a significant variation in the degree to which white families make deliberate
attempts to make their adopted black children feel proud of their heritage and part of a
black cultural community. Id. There is, however, no "evidence that such differences as
may exist in racial attitudes have any negative implications on the well-being of those
raised transracially." Id. Mahoney argues that when white parents adopt racially-
different children, they "must stop being white families and become mixed families."
Mahoney, supra note 18, at 500. She further states that many parents who adopt
transracially are willing to accept this change, and in fact, welcome it. Id. See also
Johnson et al., supra note 85, at 49-50, 52-54 (noting that the most difficult task facing
black children that are transracially adopted is developing a sense of pride in being
black).
91. Perry, supra note 5, at 110.
92. Randall Kennedy, Interracial Adoption, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1995, at 44 (emphasis
added).
93. Id. See also SIMON, ALTSTEIN & MELLI, supra note 22, at 39 (noting that there is
no scientific or empirical data which concludes "that transracial adoptions work against
the best interests of children"). See also Hayes, supra note 29, at 6.
94. Kennedy, supra note 92, at 44.
95. Forde-Mazrui, supra note 26, at 954.
96. See Julie Lythcott-Haims, Where Do Mixed Babies Belong? Racial Classification
in America and its Implications for Transracial Adoption, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
531, 555-56 (1994) (discussing transracial placement in the context of multiracial
children).
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is not satisfied by a single-factor determination of a positive racial
identity.
3. Teaching "Survival Skills"
Some argue that only black parents can teach black children the
"survival skills" necessary to cope in a racist society. Therefore, "[t]o
suggest that the skills of survival, coping and defense can be taught by
those who have never themselves learned them is at best
mystifying. ' 97 But the definition of survival skills is unclear and
controversial, and there is disagreement on the guidance that should be
provided. "[W]hat is the best advice to give?... Blacks do not agree.
Nor do whites."9' By endorsing a survival skills approach, we are
placing black and minority children on the defensive about their race
and ethnic identity in a manner that can only inculcate a self-
consciousness that is negative. While no one advocates denying one's
ethnicity, it is not necessary to make it an issue at all times. Research
has indicated that both non-white and white children brought up in
mixed-race families are less inclined to view being "white" as
necessarily positive and desirable, as compared to the perceptions of
those children raised in same-race families. 99 By demystifying the
"otherness" of different races,'° and by blurring the racial boundaries
that are pernicious and which have greatly harmed our society, we can
begin to move away from a racist society to a racially-aware and
integrated community.
4. Biracial and Multiracial Children - Misfits?
Racial-matching policies do not distinguish between black and
biracial children. The NABSW argues that biracial children should be
considered black.'0 ' In American and British societies, too, a biracial
child is regarded as black. If one natural parent is colored and the
other is white, the child is categorized as black.'°2 Further, multiracial
children in the United States are categorized according to the "one-
97. Bowen, supra note 57, at 510. See Amuzie Chimezie, Transracial Adoption of
Black Children, 20 Soc. WORK 296 (1975).
98. Kennedy, supra note 92, at 44. See also Hayes, supra note 29, at 17.
99. See, e.g., SIMON & ALTSTEIN, TRANSRACIAL ADOPTION, supra note 20, at 126, 161
(noting that although the practice of transracial adoption may have a revolutionary
impact upon adoptees' notions of racial identity, "it is ... too early to predict . . . what
is likely to happen ... in later years during adolesence and adulthood").
100. See Bartholet, Politics of Race Matching, supra note 1, at 1173.
101. Bowen, supra note 57, at 505 n.88.
102. Forde-Mazrui, supra note 26, at 955-56 n.168. See Martin Mears, Adoption,
Bigotry and Race, 140 NEw L.J. 564, 565 (1990).
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drop" rule: if the child has at least one drop of another race in her, she
is regarded as non-white.10 3 Thus, some adoption agencies in the
United States have engaged in a form of skin color matching for
multiracial children. For example, dark-skinned children are placed
with black parents, tan-skinned children are considered appropriate for
Hispanic parents, and only pale-skinned children are seen as white.
104
The NABSW's view, however, is that multiracial children should be
placed only with black families.'0 5 In Britain, too, there are attempts
to color-coordinate families in order to establish the same racial
combination of the multiracial child in adoptive/foster parents.'°6
Nevertheless, these children are as much black or colored as they
are white. "If it is important to reflect the racial and cultural
background of the child, why is it any less important to reflect the
white part?"' 1 7 Thus, to the extent that courts or child welfare agencies
treat a biracial or multiracial child as black, they are, in effect,
incorrectly imposing a racial identity on her.
This narrow view of biracial children is especially surprising in light
of the increase in interracial marriages in the United States and in
Britain. 0 8 It would be unacceptable to disapprove of racial mixing in
marriages. Similarly, "[I]t is reactionary to criticize mixed adoptions
simply on the grounds that somehow the identity of the partners in this
103. Lythcott-Haims, supra note 96, at 532.
104. Id. at 553.
105. Id. at 555. Lythcott-Haims states that, in a perfect world, where there are
sufficient numbers of qualified adoptive parents of all races, arguably children should be
raised by parents of the same race. Id. at 557. "But the attempt to create that perfect
world through race matching fails because the complex issues of culture in a Multiracial
society cannot be solved simply by placing Multiracial children with Black parents."
Id.
106. Re N (A Minor)(Adoption) [1990] 1 FLR 58, 62.
107. Richard White, Transracial Adoption Placements, 139 NEw L.J. 1307, 1312
(1989). See also Bagley, Transracial Adoption in Britain, supra note 30, at 287 (noting
that "[a]dvocates of mixed-race families, such as the British Harmony group ... argue
that mixed-race children are neither black nor Caucasian, but both, and form a special
ethnic or cultural group").
108. There has been almost a fourfold increase in interracial (black/white) marriages
in the United States since the Supreme Court's decision in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S.
1 (1967), which held the prohibition of interracial marriages unconstitutional. Lynell
George, Cross Colors, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1994, at El, E2 (stating that the number of
interracial marriages escalated to more than 200,000 in 1991). In Britain,
approximately one-fifth of all marriages involving a black person are between black and
white partners. Bagley, Transracial Adoption in Britain, supra note 30, at 296. The
increase in interracial marriages, combined with the high divorce rate, indicate that a
greater number of children will probably be raised by a racially-different step-parent, as
well as a greater number of custody disputes concerning children of interracial marriages.
Perry, supra note 5, at 52-53.
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relationship will be changed."''2 9 Arguably, children of such marriages
will have similar experiences as those children transracially placed.
Thus, to draw a parallel between "mixed marriages" and "mixed
adoptions," in general, the children in these multiracial environments
successfully adjust and develop their own identities." Therefore, the
individuality of the child and the other salient needs must not be
ignored in pursuit of rigid policies. Likewise, biased political views,
which may promote harmful practices and obscure the objective of
serving the child's best interests in stability and permanence, should
not be endorsed.
5. No Longer Black or White
It is fallacious to assume that a person's identity is single-faceted
and dominated by race. To let ethnicity determine one's identity
exclusively is to assume a narrow perspective which is damaging. If
transracial adoptees state that they are human beings first rather than
members of any specific ethnic group, or that they do not want to
follow their ethnic culture, "[t]he obvious conclusion to be drawn from
this evidence is that there is more than one viable form of identity.'''''
Research has, nevertheless, indicated that transracial adoptees have
developed as positive a sense of racial identity and pride as other
minority children." 12 Further, some studies indicate that transracially
adopted children are more positive and confident in their relationships
with whites than black children raised in black families. They are
more perceptive about race relations and develop a racially-integrated
approach to life." 3 Although those who oppose transracial adoption
state that these children gain white friends at the expense of their racial
identity and self-esteem, it is submitted that such an intolerant view
ignores social realities and cannot be substantiated. Why should
interracial friendships constitute a threat to one's racial identity and be
any less satisfying than same-race relationships? Other studies have
109. Bagley, Transracial Adoption in Britain, supra note 30, at 293.
110. Id.
111. Hayes, supra note 29, at 7. Hayes argues that if transracial adoptees are
otherwise well-adjusted without a strong ethnic identity, then this lack of ethnic identity
does not really present an obstacle. Id. However, he rightly points out that opponents
of transracial adoption incorrectly treat the absence of ethnic identity as a problem in
and of itself Id.
112. William M. Womack & Wayne Fulton, Transracial Adoption and the Black
Preschool Child, 20 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD PSYCHIATRY 712, 722 (1981) (finding no
significant difference between black children adopted transracially and the black
children who were not adopted, nor any indication that transracial adoption inculcates
"any obviously negative or antiblack attitude" in black adoptees).
113. SIMON & ALTSTEIN, TRANSRACIAL ADOPTEES, supra note 23, at 59-68, 80-83.
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indicated that transracial adoption may have a positive impact on the
adoptive parents' birth children, as they "have developed insight,
sensitivity and a tolerance that they could not have acquired in the
ordinary course of life. '114 This in turn may result in positive
consequences for the adopted child. Almost all of the adoptive parents
would recommend the practice of transracial adoption to other families
and do it again." 5
Thus, what in some cases might seem an "unsuccessful" transracial
adoption often has its roots in institutional or extended foster care.
Before dismissing the transracial placement as a failure, the length of
time a child has spent in such institutional care, and the quality of that
care, must be considered." 6 Similarly, if a person raised in an
interracial family does not develop into a well-adjusted person, it is
difficult to ascertain what part race played in that final result." 7
Silverman and Feigelman state that, despite the success of
transracial adoption, it is an option that is often disregarded:
Perhaps the most disturbing part of our review of the transracial
adoption literature is the extent to which it is ignored in
formulating adoption policy. We are not recommending
transracial placements as a panacea for the problems of family
disintegration among non-white minorities in the United States.
But their success suggests that they may at least be a useful
resource. The effort to expand intraracial placement for
minority children, however, does not require the cessation of
transracial placements. At a time when few black leaders are
sanguine about the deplorably low income and employment
levels found among minority underclasses, as the rates of
adolescent out-of-wedlock pregnancies continue to mount,
transracial placement is a resource that cannot easily be
ignored." 18
Parents who are racially dissimilar from the children they adopt can
assist them in encouraging a positive racial identity. Further, their
114. Id. at 108-09.
115. Id.
116. Howard, supra note 19, at 537 n.169. Simon and Altstein state that there is a
link between parents who admit to having difficulties with an adopted child and the race
of the adopted child. SIMON & ALTSTEIN, TRANSRACIAL ADOPTION, supra note 20, at 89.
However, the explanation most commonly offered for the difficulties are the problems
which have developed while the child was in foster care prior to being adopted, and are
not due to the child's race. Id. See also Silverman & Feigelman, supra note 18, at 198.
117. Perry, supra note 5, at 104 n.182.
118. Silverman & Feigelman, supra note 18, at 200. Hayes argues that almost all the
evidence concerning minority children in adoptive homes indicates that transracial
adoption is as successful as same-race adoption. Hayes, supra note 29, at 4-5.
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efforts can be supported by developing techniques such as pre-
adoption sessions and post-adoption consultation that would help them
and their children identify with the child's ethnicity and culture,
depending on the circumstances of the case." 9 By not emphasizing
racial differences and through seeking stable, permanent homes for
children, transracial adoption serves their best interests. This group of
children "represent a different and special cohort, one socialized in two
worlds and therefore perhaps better prepared to operate in both.'
120
B. The Best Interests Standard
The best interests standard has often been criticized as being unclear
and unsatisfactory.1 It "does not encourage even the well-intentioned
judge to be sensitive to the ways in which his own possible biases and
assumptions may influence his decision-making process."' 122 In any
11 9. See generally Bartholet, Politics of Race Matching, supra note 1 (discussing
author's personal experience with transracial adoption and her arguments in favor of it).
120. SIMON & ALTSTEIN, TRANSRACIAL ADOPTEES, supra note 23, at 10. One study
reported that children who are transracially adopted seem comfortable with discussing
and asking about their adoption, perhaps because the fact of adoption is apparent.
Johnson, supra note 85, at 49. The study further stated that 65% of such children had
asked about their biological parents, compared with only 30% of children adopted by
same-race families. Id.
12 1. Robert H. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face
of Indeterminacy, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 226 (Summer 1975) (providing a basis
for most discussions that criticize the best interests standard). See supra text
accompanying notes 61-63 for a discussion of the best interests standard. See also
Stephen Parker, The Best Interests of the Child-Principles and Problems, 8 INT'L J.L. &
FAM. 26, 27-28 (1994) (arguing that the best interests principle can be diluted
depending on the particular statutory wording in a legal system). Parker explained that,
while a child's welfare could be the "paramount consideration" in the proceedings, a
weaker standard would provide that "first consideration" should be given to promoting
the child's welfare. Id. A further dilution can be seen in Article 3(1) of the United
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, which states that "the best interests of
the child shall be a primary consideration." Id. (citing United Nations Convention on
the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, art. 3, para. 1).
122. Perry, supra note 5, at 79. Both American and British law demonstrate that
there is no clear answer as to the weight that should be given to race, and racial issues
tend to dominate the balancing exercise in the best interests test. See infra Parts IV.C.,
V.B. Silverman and Feigelman argue that judges make value-laden decisions and do not
use the results of social science research on transracial adoption. Silverman &
Feigelman, supra note 18, at 191. Further, Mnookin states:
Deciding what is best for a child poses a question no less ultimate than the
purposes and values of life itself.... [W]here is the judge to look for the set of
values that should inform the choice of what is best for the child? Normally,
the custody statutes do not themselves give content or relative weights to the
pertinent values. And if the judge looks to society at large, he finds neither a
clear consensus as to the best child rearing strategies nor an appropriate
hierarchy of ultimate values.
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event, a more sensible label for the test does not eliminate the
balancing of competing factors and the difficulties inherent in that
process, especially when a complex factor like race is part of the
equation.
123
Arguably, what is particularly pernicious is the hidden agenda, the
undisclosed social and political policies which, in reality, may be far
from the child's best interest. Proponents of race matching often
couch their political objectives in psychological terms; the "need" for a
child to develop an ethnic identity is deemed to be a universal,
psychological imperative. 124 The promotion of other social goals is
not the purpose of adoption. For example, the organizational interests
of child placement agencies and the concerns of minority groups
seeking to protect and develop their ethnic and cultural integrity
125
should not divert the adoption process from serving the child's best
interests.
Despite the arguments made by proponents of race matching, racial-
matching policies delay the placement of children.2 6 "A child whose
placement is delayed suffers immediate, concrete, and probably
irreparable harm. Black culture, by contrast, if harmed at all, suffers
the minute and diffuse harm that results when a de minimis number of
Black children are placed in white homes."'127 Studies have concluded
that delays in placement are far more harmful than any transracial
placement, and that the later a child is placed, the greater the
Mnookin, supra note 121, at 260-61.
123. Howard, supra note 19, at 533 (citing J. GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST
INTEREST OF THE CHILD 53-64 (1973)). Some commentators have suggested that a
different standard, "the least detrimental alternative standard," should be introduced in
order to dispel the idea that there is an ideal solution to child placement. See id.
Supporters of this standard argue that both the courts and social workers should assess,
in a practical manner, the choices available, recognize the risks and drawbacks of each,
and then choose an option that provides the least likelihood of harm to the child. Id. at
533 n.150. Mnookin, however, states that the best interests principle is
"indeterminate," and treats the "least detrimental alternative" standard in a similar
manner. Mnookin, supra note 121, at 248-49, 256-62, and 285-87. See also Re 0
(Transracial Adoption: Contact) [1995] 2 FLR 597, 605.
124. Hayes, supra note 29, at 10. Opponents of transracial adoption misuse the best
interests framework by averring that the child's interests come first, whereas in reality,
the essence of these racial matching policies is to subscribe to segregatory practices and
separatist objectives that are not in the best interests of children. Id. at 19.
125. Howard, supra note 19, at 504. Howard argues that using the phrase "best
interests" to describe all the various competing interests, obscures the importance of
that fact. Id. at 503. "The effect of this obfuscation is to include in child placement
decisions considerations that serve other political and social ends but are unrelated to
the best interests of the affected child." Id. See also Hayes, supra note 29, at 14-16.
126. See Bartholet, Politics of Race Matching, supra note 1, at 1201-06.
127. Forde-Mazrui, supra note 26, at 962.
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adjustment difficulties.2 8 Similarly, the benefits of a permanent,
stable home, whatever the family's racial composition, are undeniable.
The best interests, therefore, that racial-matching policies are meant to
achieve must surely be questioned. In the attempt to secure the right
racial match, children wait in institutions or are moved through foster
homes, which disrupts any bonds that have been formed. These are
practices that may encourage racial integrity but do not necessarily
promote the child's best interests." 9
Racial-matching policies seem to eliminate the personalized
attention that the best interests test mandates for each individual child.
Social workers could better balance the interests of the child if they
approached adoption placement from a racially-neutral perspective.
Such an approach would indeed serve the overall well-being of
children and avoid focusing only on the child's ethnic identity.
Furthermore, there is no certainty that a delay in the process will result
in placement either with adoptive parents or a foster family who will
encourage and nurture the child's ethnicity. Arguably, what would be
in the child's best interests is a change in the attitudes and perceptions
concerning racial separatism. Moreover, an institutional setting cannot
guarantee a positive racial identity either. Thus, opponents of race-
based placement argue that "[t]he discretion permitted under the best
interests test permits racial issues to dominate other concerns even
where there is no guarantee that the interest allegedly sought to be
protected will be furthered."' 3 °
IV. LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS
IN THE UNITED STATES
Legislative actions and judicial decisions regarding race matching
mirror the practical difficulties and issues that arise from race
matching. In addition, constitutional issues arise whenever a
legislature or an agency adopts or endorses race-matching policies.
Courts are left with the struggle to consider race matching and its
attendant political and legal questions within the context of the best
interests standard.
128. See Bartholet, Politics of Race Matching, supra note 1, at 1224.
129. Simon and Altstein also state that if society's primary objective is the child's
welfare, "our social orientation suggests it would be more in the child's best interest to
grow up in a family situation than to suffer the often dire effects of long-term
institutionalization or, to a lesser degree, the insecurity of foster placement." SIMON &
ALTSTEIN, TRANSRACIAL ADOPTION, supra note 20, at 22.
130. Perry, supra note 5, at 82. To deny a child a home, even if it is partly based on
speculation as to the possible racial problems that might arise in the future, is to totally
discount the vital importance to a child of growing up in a permanent, stable family. Id.
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A. Racial Matching and Affirmative Action
Professor Randall Kennedy states that "[r]acial matching should
have been consigned to the same dustbin into which de jure
segregation was dispatched a generation ago. After all, one of the
great achievements of the civil rights revolution was the
institutionalization of skepticism toward state-sponsored racial
distinctions."'' Title VI of the United States Civil Rights Act of 1964
provides that programs which receive federal funds cannot
discriminate on the basis of race, color, or national origin.'32
Nevertheless, the federal policy guidelines interpret the anti-
discrimination principle of Title VI within the context of adoption and
foster care in a different manner. The guidelines state that:
In placing a child in an adoptive or foster home it may be
appropriate to consider race, color, or national origin as one of
several factors .... This policy is based on unique aspects of
the relationship between a child and his or her adoptive or foster
parent. It should not be construed as applicable to any other
child welfare or human services area covered by Title VI.33
In no other area of community life do state and state-licensed
decision makers use race as a factor as unerringly as when making
decisions in adoption cases.'34 Congress has generally drafted the
anti-discrimination ethic in the United States, such as the "equal
protection of the laws" or "prohibiting discrimination on the basis of
race," in terms that are racially neutral to protect all groups. The
following limited circumstances have warranted race-conscious action
in the United States: where a compelling need justifies it; where it
prevents discrimination in order to benefit racial minority groups; or
where it rectifies the effects of past discrimination through affirmative
action.135 In any event, these exceptions are very narrow in definition
13 1. Kennedy, supra note 92, at 44.
132. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1988).
133. H.R. REP. No. 761, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2807, 3254. These regulations are important as most state adoption agencies and
several private agencies are provided with federal funds.
134. Bartholet, Politics of Race Matching, supra note 1, at 1226. For a concise
overview of legislation and case law see SIMON, ALTSTEIN & MELLI, supra note 22, at 15-
27.
135. Bartholet, Politics of Race Matching, supra note 1, at 1227-28.
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as well as application. 3 6 As a result, racial-matching policies do not
fit into any of the recognized exceptions.'37
Notwithstanding the argument that racial-matching policies resemble
affirmative action, these policies actually counteract the rationale of
such programs, which are meant to promote racial integration, not
separation. "Both anti-discrimination law and affirmative action
programs have been designed to break down segregatory barriers and
to promote integration."'' 38 Courts in the United States have, for the
most part, upheld affirmative action programs that (1) are limited in
duration, (2) look backwards rather than forward, and (3) are
structured in a way that moves society closer to a stage where race can
be totally removed as a factor in making decisions. 13' Racial-matching
policies, however, contradict these requirements because they seem
unlimited in duration, look ahead as much as at the past, and require
race to be entrenched as a factor in the decision-making process.14
The goal of affirmative action is not to harm one section of a minority
community while purportedly benefiting another part of that group.
Racial separation, in the form of racial-matching policies, promotes
ethnic identity, yet operates at the expense of depriving children the
opportunity to be placed in permanent homes.
Although some may argue that the racial problems in the United
States have more to do with oppression and racial hierarchies than
separatism, 1 ' divisions along racial lines, as in racial-matching
policies arguably constitute a similar kind of racial oppression, are as
harmful as racism, and must be considered part of the offensive racial
hierarchy. Whatever the form, a policy of racial stratification must
end. Moreover, the adoption forum is not the appropriate place to
136. Id. An extensive discussion of affirmative action programs is beyond the scope
of this Article. Nevertheless, a recent Supreme Court decision, Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995), indicates the Supreme Court's position. All
official (federal, state, or local) race-based programs must be analyzed by a reviewing
court under the 'strict-scrutiny' standard. Id. at 2100. Thus to accord differential
treatment because of race can only be justified for the most compelling reasons, that is
to remedy the effects of prior discrimination. Id. at 2101. See also David G. Savage,
Race Matters: New Cases Return A Volatile Issue To The Top Of The Supreme Court's
Agenda, 8 1-Jan. A.B.A. J. 40, 42 (1995) (discussing Adarand).
137. Bartholet, Politics of Race Matching, supra note 1, at 1231-32 (including an
interesting discussion on how racial matching policies may be seen, in a general sense,
as a remedial justification). See also Mahoney, supra note 18, at 490 (discussing
transracial adoption in light of the strict scrutiny of racial discrimination).
138. Bartholet, Politics of Race Matching, supra note 1, at 1233.
139. id. at 1232.
140. Id. at 1232-33.
141. Id. at 1234. See also Shelby Steele, Race and the Curse of Good Intentions,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1995, at A27.
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promote ethnic self-determination, if indeed that is what racial-
matching policies seek to achieve.
B. Racial Matching Legislation
The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978142 was enacted to rectify the
discriminatory treatment of Indian families and their children by the
states.143 It was also an effort to preserve Native-American culture and
to give that community rights in the placement of its children.
Congress found that "an alarmingly high percentage of Indian families
are broken up by the removal, often unwarranted, of their children
from them by nontribal public and private agencies and that an
alarmingly high percentage of such children are placed in non-Indian
foster and adoptive homes and institutions."' 14 The Act thus gives
first preference to the child's extended family, then to members of the
child's tribe, followed by other members of the Indian community. 14
Only as a final choice can a non-Indian be considered.' 46 Arguably
that legislation has set a precedent for same-race preference legislation,
and both the NABSW and scholars have stated that a similar statute
should be enacted for the black community.147 However, the number
of black and minority children transracially placed is small, and the
threat to the Native-American community and its practices is much
greater.148 Thus, because the plight of these communities is not
analogous, the need for similar legislation is not compelling. It has
also been argued that, ironically, such legislation would result in a
greater number of black and minority children being confined to years
142. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-63 (1994).
143. See 2 ANN M. HARALAMBIE, HANDLING CHILD CUSTODY, ABUSE, AND ADOPTION
CASES 115 (1993).
144. 25 U.S.C. § 1901(4) (1994) (emphasis added). Congress also determined that
the courts and agencies had a policy in effect on the placement of Indian children which
conflicted with Indian culture and indigenous child rearing practices. Id. § 1901(5). See
also Howard, supra note 19, at 520-21 (arguing that the traditional child welfare system
is insensitive to Indian culture and child-rearing practices).
145. 25 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (1994).
146. Id. Although there have been several attacks on the constitutionality of the
statute, they have been unsuccessful. A detailed discussion of those issues is beyond the
scope of this article.
147. Bowen, supra note 57, at 522-23. Bowen argues for the enactment of an Afro-
American Child Welfare Act, which would, inter alia, form an Afro-American Child
Welfare Commission responsible for evaluating all cases where black children are (or
will be) removed from their biological parents. Id. See also id. at 533-44 app. (laying
out a proposed draft for the Afro-American Child Welfare Act of 1988).
148. Howard, supra note 19, at 532-33.
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of institutional or foster care and denied permanent placement and a
stable family life because of their race. 49
Some state legislatures in the United States have, however,
incorporated same-race placement policies into their laws. ° For
example, "[t]he policy of the state of Minnesota is to ensure that the
best interests of the child are met by requiring due, not sole,
consideration of the child's race or ethnic heritage in adoption
placements."'' Most recently, federal legislation in the form of the
Improving America's Schools Act of 1994 attempts to address, in
part, the racial issues that have troubled the adoption and foster care
process. "'52 Part E of Title V (Miscellaneous Provisions) of the Act
refers to "Multiethnic Placement," and prohibits any adoption or foster
care agency or entity which receives federal funds from (a)
categorically denying a person the opportunity to adopt a child or
become a foster parent solely on the basis of race, color, national
origin, either of the child or the adoptive/foster parent; or (b) denying
or delaying a child's adoptive or foster care placement, or in any other
manner discriminating when making a placement decision, solely on
the basis of race, color or national origin of the child or the adoptive or
foster parent. 153
Although the Act states in section 553(e) that noncompliance is
deemed to violate Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Act,
unfortunately, does not go far enough. Section 553(a)(2) provides for
a "permissible consideration" which operates to, in effect, largely
defeat the purpose of the prohibitions. Accordingly, an agency or
relevant entity is permitted to consider the child's cultural, racial, or
ethnic background, and to consider whether the prospective adoptive
or foster parents are capable of meeting the needs of the child, as one
of the several factors to be considered when determining the best
interests of the child. Phrases in the Act such as "may consider" and
"one of a number of factors" are probably meant to provide some
reassurance that, in determining the best interests of the child, a multi-
149. SIMON, ALTSTEIN & MELLI, supra note 22, at 49.
150. See SIMON, ALTSTEIN & MELLI, supra note 22, at 16-19 (approximately 20 states
specifically make reference to race in their adoption laws, seven of which prohibit the
use of race to deny an adoption or a placement, while Minnesota, California, and
Arkansas have laws which mandate a same-race preference in adoption).
151. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.29 (West 1996).
152. Prior to this, adoption (and transracial practices) were primarily determined by
state laws.
153. Improving America's Schools Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-382, 108 Stat.
3518 (1994).
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factor exercise will take place in which competing concerns are
balanced without race being excessively emphasized.
Those concessions are not convincing, however. In practice, the
Act may assist some families to foster children or adopt those from
different racial backgrounds that are already in their care."' But it will
probably give rise to protracted litigation that is emotionally charged,
can only harm the child, and will not make much of a difference to the
lives of many children who are the subjects of a bitter debate.
C. Judicial Juggling of Race
The state cannot compel the use of race as a factor in regulating the
private lives of people.' For example, in Loving v. Virginia,156 the
United States Supreme Court held that it was unconstitutional to
prohibit interracial marriages.'57 Further, in Palmore v. Sidoti, 118 the
Supreme Court unanimously ruled that, on the facts of a child custody
case, the use of race as a deciding factor violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.'59 Chief Justice Burger
reiterated that the best interests of the child had to be protected. Justice
Burger stated, "[T]here is a risk that a child living with a stepparent of
a different race may be subject to a variety of pressures and stresses
not present if the child were living with parents of the same racial or
ethnic origin."'160  But the equal protection principle prohibited
considering the "reality of private biases and the possible injury they
might inflict.' 16' Although the case suggests that child custody
154. Black or White, EcONOMIST, May 14, 1994, at 33. In discussing the
implications of the Act in its preliminary stages, the bill was perceived as a "small step
away from America's increasing drift towards self-segregation." Id.
155. Bartholet, Politics of Race Matching, supra note 1, at 1227.
156. 388 U.S. 1 (1966).
157. Id. at 2. The Supreme Court struck down Virginia's anti-miscegenation statute
for violating the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id. The trial court had stated that: "Almighty God created the races white,
black, yellow, malay and red, and he placed them on separate continents. And but for the
interference with his arrangement there would be no cause for such marriages. The fact
that he separated the races shows that he did not intend the races to mix." Id. at 3 (citing
the trial judge's opinion).
158. 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
159. Id. at 433. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution states,
in relevant part, "nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
160. Palmore, 466 U.S. at 433.
16 1. Id. (emphasis added). The white biological father petitioned the court for the
custody of his white child, arguing that it would be harmful for the child to be raised in a
black neighborhood by the child's mother and black boyfriend with whom she was
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decisions cannot be made on the basis of an interracial marriage, and is
encouraging in that respect, in reality the decision is narrow and does
not provide much guidance for racial issues in adoption cases. In
other words, Palmore states that race may not be the sole factor when
removing a child from her natural mother in a child custody case.
162
1. Not Only, But Also
In Compos v. McKeithen, a federal court prohibited strictly race-
based adoptions, declaring a Louisiana state statute invalid for
specifically disallowing transracial adoption.163 The Louisiana statute
at issue mandated that "[a] single person over the age of twenty-one
years, or a married couple jointly, may petition to adopt any child of
his or their race."' 164  The plaintiffs, a Caucasian couple, were
interested in adopting a black child. 165 They were informed by the
various adoption services that a black child of suitable age was not
available, and that, in any event, the Louisiana statute prohibited
interracial adoption. 66 The authorities had also made no effort to
inquire about the couple's home life or their general parental fitness to
adopt a child. 16
7
The plaintiffs sued, and a federal district court invalidated the
Louisiana statute under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause. The court stated that, because any consideration of race in a
statute is constitutionally suspect, there had to be some compelling
state objective to justify the racial classification. 68 Thus, if the racial
living prior to marrying him. Id. at 430.
162. Id. at 432, 434. See Forde-Mazrui, supra note 26, at 932; see also SIMON,
ALTSTEIN & MELLI, supra note 22, at 24 (arguing that Palmore is especially important
because racial issues were not permitted to be part of the best interest analysis
concerning the child); Bowen, supra note 57, at 522 n.184 (arguing that Palmore is
correctly decided on its facts and that the decision "speaks to a situation (custody battle
between former spouses) where the social fact of racism should not be allowed to enter
because it has no place"); infra note 174 and accompanying text (discussing In re
R.M.G., 454 A.2d 776 (D.C. 1982), a case in which the court considered race in
determining placement).
163. 341 F. Supp. 264 (E.D. La. 1972).
164. Id. at 264, 268 (citing LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:422 (West 1950) (amended 1975
deleting reference to race, repealed 1992 by ACT No. 235, § 17, 1991 LA. ACTS 1056)).
165. Id. at 265.
166. Id. at 265 (referring to LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:422 (1950)).
167. Id. "The actions of ... [the adoption agencies] in refusing the requests for
adoption reflect solely the provision of the state law and were not the product of any
investigation into the requesting couples' home life or their fitness as adoptive
parents." Id.
168. Id. at 266. The defendants argued that the use of race as a factor in adoption was
reasonable because of the duty to find a child a home "where he can develop normally...
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classification was not reasonable in light of its purpose, it could be
seen as "arbitrary, invidious discrimination.""' The court further
stated that the defendants could not conclusively claim that foster care
or institutional life was always preferable to a transracial placement.'70
However, the court did recognize the innate difficulties in transracial
adoption, which could justify the consideration of race in adoption
placements.' But, while race could be regarded as a "relevant"
factor, the Fourteenth Amendment prevented it from being the
"determinative" factor.' Thus, the court stated that if race is made the
decisive factor, it "subordinates the child's best interests in some
circumstances to racial discrimination .... The statute thus promotes
not the child's best interests but only the integrity of race in the
adoptive family relationship."''
In the case of In re R.M.G., a white foster couple sought to adopt
a black child whom they had raised for almost two years.' This was
challenged by the child's black paternal grandmother who argued that
the child should be placed with her. 7 6 The trial court considered all
the relevant factors and found both families suitable, but concluded
that the racial factor favored the black, biological grandparents.7
The court of appeals, however, reversed the lower court's decision,
concluding that the trial court's analysis of the race factor was
The rational basis suggested is that it is not normal or natural for white parents to beget
a black child or for black parents to beget a white child." Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. In making its decision, the court stated:
Cognizant of the realities of American society, this Court would agree that an
interracial home in Louisiana presents difficulties for a child, including the
possible refusal by a community to accept the child, and other community
pressures, born of racial prejudice, on the interracial family. A determination
of reasonableness of racial classification in this statute would seem to follow
recognition of such difficulties, but we regard the difficulties inherent in
interracial adoption as justifying consideration of race as a relevant factor in
adoption, and not as justifying race as the determinative factor.
Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 267. The court did not believe that the disadvantages in a transracial
adoption would in all cases outweigh the advantages of having a permanent home and
family life instead of an institution or foster care. Id.
174. 454 A.2d 776 (D.C. 1982). This case has been described as "[tihe Definitive
Case." Bowen, supra note 57, at 517.
175. In re R.M.G., 454 A.2d at 780.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 781-82.
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imprecise and not sufficient to satisfy constitutional standards.' The
court of appeals stated that the District of Columbia's adoption statute,
with its express recognition of race among the factors relevant to
adoption, had to be considered under the strict scrutiny standard of the
equal protection framework.' 79 The court stated that racial
classifications are constitutional only when they advance a compelling
or overriding government interest and if the particular use of race is
essential to achieve that purpose.'80 Further, the court explained that a
compelling government interest is only served when the racial
classification is specifically designed to achieve its legitimate
purpose.'8 ' Upon analyzing the statute, the court of appeals concluded
that the Act did not deny equal protection of the laws and thus
withstood constitutional challenge but that the trial court might not
have applied it correctly. 82
The court of appeals delineated the analytic steps concerning race
that the trial court should have addressed. The three relevant concerns
were: (1) the manner in which each family's race would impact "the
child's development of a sense of identity, including racial identity;"
(2) comparing each family in that respect; and (3) the importance of
those racial differences when all the relevant factors pertaining to
adoption were considered. 8 3 Although the trial court had focused on
178. Id. at 779-80. In its assessment of the trial court's decision, the appellate court
stated:
Although race, among other factors, can be relevant in deciding between
competing petitions for adoption, the statute expressly incorporating that
factor, as well as the trial court's application of it, must survive 'strict
scrutiny,' in order to comport with the equal protection requirement of the
Constitution. I conclude that the statute on its face withstands constitutional
challenge but that the trial court's application is not sufficiently precise to
satisfy the Constitution.
Id.
179. Id. at 784-86.
180. Id. at 784.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 779-80.
183. Id. at 791. See also Perry, supra note 5, at 118 n.227 (arguing that even the
trial court set up a "structured process" for the analysis of race in the best interests
framework).
In a later case, the same court did not follow the three-step analysis set out in R.M.G.
In re D.I.S., 494 A.2d 1316 (D.C. 1985). The D.LS. court stated that it was not sensible
to depart from the flexible infrastructure established by the best interests test. Id. at
1327. The meaning of identity had also been elaborated upon in R.M.G. as entailing:
"(1) a sense of 'belonging' in a stable family community; (2) a feeling of self-esteem
and confidence; and (3) 'survival skills' that enable a child to cope with the world
outside the family. One's sense of identity, therefore, includes perceptions of oneself as
both an individual and a social being." In re R.M.G., 454 A.2d at 787.
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the first step, it had not engaged in a comparative analysis of both
families required by the following two steps. Arguably, if the lower
court had articulated a thorough consideration of those factors and if
considerable importance was given to the effect of severing the child's
ties with her foster parents 8 4 and the other positive factors which
favored them, the balance should have tipped in their favor. 85
The foster parents had argued that the equal protection doctrine
prohibited the use of race as a relevant criterion in adoption matters.18 6
The court of appeals, however, could not accept that statement without
qualification. The court stated that "an inherently suspect, indeed
presumptively invalid, racial classification in the adoption statute is, in
a constitutional sense, necessary to advance a compelling
governmental interest: the best interest of the child."'' 87 Nevertheless,
the court reversed and remanded the case because the evidence
evaluated by the trial court had been insufficient to confirm that race
had not been impermissibly used to automatically or presumptively
favor the same-race grandparents.'88 Race could only be considered as
a factor if there was an affirmative justification for doing so.' 89 The
race factor was apparently determinative of the case,' 90 but the trial
court's analysis failed to provide the requisite reasoning to satisfy a
184. The decision seemed to ignore the fact that removal from the foster parents
home could cause emotional damage to the child. However, until such time as the
continuity of relationships is given sufficient importance, the best interests test will
probably result in a decision that favors the black parent. Perry, supra note 5, at 118-19
n.227. In that respect, an encouraging development can be noted in a New York case
where a white lesbian was permitted to adopt her three year old African-American foster
child despite the fact that the child's African-American grandmother wished to adopt her.
In re Commitment of J.N., 681 N.Y.S.2d 215 (Fam. Ct. 1993). The court found that the
child had established strong emotional ties with her foster mother and had lived with her
since she was four months of age. Id. at 218. The court maintained that disruption in the
child's life would be harmful and against her best interests. Id.
185. In re R.M.G., 454 A.2d at 793.
186. Id. at 784.
187. Id. at 788.
188. Id. In discussing the use of race as a factor, the court stated:
[l]f race is to be a relevant factor, the court cannot properly weight it, either
automatically or presumptively-i.e., without regard to evidence-for or
against cross-racial adoption. To do so would add a racially-discriminatory
policy to evaluation of the child's best interest. As a consequence, in an
adoption contest, petitioners of a particular race would receive a head start,
contrary to the constitutional requirement that the use of race-which is
"presumptively invalid"-must be affirmatively justified.
Id. at 787.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 793 n.40.
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reviewing court that the inclusion and assessment of race was precisely
tailored for the best interests of the child.' 9'
The trial court had expressed concern that little medical or scientific
attention had been paid to racial matters in the context of adoption and
that "there are not conclusive absolutes to be drawn on the basis of
race." 92 Yet, despite those concerns, the court stated that "it would
seem, however, entirely reasonable that as a child grows older the
ramifications of this problem would increase."'' 93 The court thus
allowed the racial factor to tip its decision in favor of the black
grandparents.' 94 The dissenting judge, while acknowledging the
paucity of empirical data, especially in the adolescent years, confirmed
the trial court's finding that, in all probability, questions concerning
racial identity would arise later. 95 According to the dissent, the trial
court's conclusion that such risks exist was well substantiated by trial
testimony, despite the general conclusion that there was a dearth of
materials in this area. 196
The trial court ignored the efforts and the conscious attempts that the
foster parents had made to help the child integrate racially and socially.
For example, the parents had previously adopted another black child,
and they lived in a racially-integrated area that had mixed-race
schools.' 97 They were well equipped with their earlier experiences of
transracial adoption, had black history pre-school books and coloring
books, and were well prepared to augment the child's awareness of
her racial identity.198 The child in question was almost two years old
and had already suffered several traumatic changes in her life; another
disruption would only harm her yet again.' 99 In fact, the court of
appeals stated that when all the factors were considered, including
financial, blood ties, stability of the family and the effect of moving the
child, the grandparents' claim was "somewhat less than, or at best
equal" to that of the foster parents. 200 Thus, but for the race factor, the
trial court's decision might well have been quite different.2°'
191. Id. at 794.
192. Id. at 792.
193. Id. at 782 (emphasis added).
194 Id. at 792-93 & n.40
195. Id. at 797-98 & nn.4 & 5.
196. Howard, supra note 19, at 542. The author comments: "Thus, social science
speculation is elevated to social science fact." Id.
197. In reR.M.G., 454 A.2d at 780.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 781.
200. Id. at 793 n.40.
201. Bowen argues that:
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In McLaughlin v. Pernsley,2 °2 a federal court held that the removal
of a black child from white foster parents solely on the basis of race
violated the Equal Protection Clause.2 3 The child had been with the
foster parents for a two year period from the time he was five months
old.20 4 Later, when a black foster family became available, the
defendants moved the child. 20 5  The plaintiffs argued that the
defendants' decision to place the child with a black family was solely
on the basis of race and violated their rights to equal protection under
the law and due process guaranteed to them by the Fourteenth
Amendment. °3
The defendants had acted pursuant to their policy against transracial
adoption and cross-racial, long-term foster care placements.2 7 The
plaintiffs had provided a sensitive, caring and secure home for the
child, who was psychologically attached to them.20 8 Thus the decision
to move the child had nothing to do with the quality of care given. °9
Further, the child was suffering from depression upon being moved
from his foster parents and was likely to suffer irreparable damage
from the disruption.2'0 The court thus stated that when a government
entity, such as the Department of Human Services, determines a foster
care placement on the basis of race, a decision made by racial
classification is inherently suspect and is subject to strict judicial
scrutiny.2'
[flor the present, the social fact of racism in America does not allow R.M.G. to
be ignored .... R.M.G. proffers a rule that an intrinsic aspect of the child (his
'skin-color-defined race') must necessarily be considered in determining his
best interests even where that factor - race - is 'inherently suspect, indeed
presumptively invalid.'
Bowen, supra note 57, at 522 n.184. The distinction that Bowen makes between the
relevance of racial issues in child custody cases such as Palmore, 466 U.S. 429 (1984),
where he maintains that it has no place, and in adoption proceedings is interesting, but
not convincing.
202. 693 F. Supp. 318 (E.D. Pa. 1988), aff'd on other grounds, 876 F.2d 308 (3d Cir.
1989).
203. Id. at 323. The petitioners also claimed that their due process rights were
violated because they did not receive any of the procedural rights the regulations
provided. Id. at 327.
204. Id. at 319.
205. Id. at 321.
206. Id. at 319-20.
207. Id. at 321.
208. Id.
209. Although the social workers registered minor criticisms of the McLaughlins,
the court dismissed these as attempts to explain the agency's prior culpable behavior.
Id. at 321.
210. Id. at 327.
211. Id. at 323-24. Although the court accepted the idea that racial concerns were a
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The court further stated that, rather than using race as the sole
criterion, factors such as the ability of foster parents, despite their skin
color, to adequately take care of the child and to provide a stable and
secure home should be considered. Thus the court determined that
"[f]oster care decisions made under these circumstances should not be
decided by use of pernicious generalization but rather should be
decided on individual merit.' 23 The child was returned to the custody
of his white foster parents.214
2. Not Also, But Only
In the case of In Re Davis, 215 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
stated that the trial court had made an error by not taking race into
consideration.1 6 Nevertheless, the error was "harmless" as the trial
court reached the same decision it would have had race been included,
and had granted custody to black foster parents who were also
custodians of the child's siblings. 21 7 The child lived with a white
couple who had cared for him from the time he was three days old
until the age of four.21 8 At the appellate level, the court stated that as a
biracial child is considered black, the child should be placed in a black
home.1 9 Yet the court seemed to struggle with the importance of the
racial factor in placement decisions. The court was anxious not to
place excessive emphasis on race because doing so could
"inadvertently place a premium on preservation of a status quo of racial
prejudice., 220 Nevertheless the court maintained that until such time as
racial prejudices and tensions had disappeared from society, its
obligations required it not to ignore the importance of race in
determining the child's best interests.22' Instead of assessing the
compelling government interest, it did not feel that race alone was necessary to
accomplish that interest. Id. at 324. The court noted that "[m]aking decisions about
persons according to their race is more likely to reflect racial prejudice than legitimate
public concerns." Id.
212. Id. The court also held that public interest was not served: "Removing children
from their psychological parents merely because the parties happen to be of [a] different
race can never serve the pubic interest." Id. at 331.
213. Id. at 324.
214. Id. at 332. "[A] return to the McLaughlins is not only in Raymond's best
interest but it offers Raymond his only real chance to be made whole." Id. at 331.
215. 465 A.2d 614 (Pa. 1983).
216. Id. at 622.
217. Id. at 628.
218. Id. at 617.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 628.
221. Id. at 629.
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parental fitness and stability that each family had to offer the child, and
the length of time the child had already spent with the white couple, the
appellate court was more concerned with subscribing to biased views
and the allegedly harmful repercussions of placing a "black" child with
white caregivers.
In Drummond v. Fulton County Department of Family & Children's
Services.,223 white foster parents sought to adopt the biracial child
placed with them for a period of two years.224  The level of care
provided by them had been consistently evaluated as excellent.225
Nevertheless, the child placement agency determined that as the child
was phenotypically black, and would retain the characteristics of his
black father, the white foster couple would be denied their adoption
request.226 Although the agency did not have a black home in which to
place the child, it was their intention to find one.227
It was thus apparent that the child's race and that of the Drummonds
were given substantial weight in reaching the placement decision.228
The court stated that "consideration of race in the child placement
process suggests no racial slur or stigma in connection with any race,"
and that it was but natural for children to be brought up by parents of
the same race. 229 The court was quite content in asserting that "[flrom
222. Id. The court stated:
In comparison with the environment at the Youngs' residence, the situation
with the Millers does not seem to be very conducive to the inculcation of a
sense of racial identity in Shane .... The record speaks loud and clear of their
love and compassion for Shane and his mother (now deceased) and their
genuine concern for people regardless of race. This discussion is only
intended to demonstrate the relevance of race as a factor in this case and the
minimal potential at the Miller farm in Stony Run for the nourishing of
Shane's personal and social identity.
Id. at 628. It should be noted that the child was of mixed race. Id.
223. 563 F.2d 1200 (5th Cir. 1977) (en banc), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 910 (1978).
224. Id. at 1203.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 1204.
227. Id.
228. Id. The dissent argued that the only consideration for removing the child was
race, and it was a misconceived perception that mixed race or black children could only
be raised by black parents. Id. at 1212-19 (Tuttle, J. dissenting).
229. Id. at 1205. The court approved the practice of the adoption agency, noting:
[A]doption agencies quite frequently try to place a child where he can most
easily become a normal family member. The duplication of his natural
biological environment is a part of that program. Such factors as age, hair
color, eye color and facial features of parents and child are considered in
reaching a decision. This flows from the belief that a child and adoptive
parents can best adjust to a normal family relationship if the child is placed
with adoptive parents who could have actually parented him. To permit
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the child's perspective, the consideration of race is simply another
facet of finding him the best possible home.
230
Although the court seemed to suggest that race cannot presumptively
deny a transracial placement,2 3' arguably race was the determining
factor, not "simply another facet" in the case. But for the racial factor,
the decision would have favored the Drummonds. Undoubtedly
parents have no right to adopt a child that they are unable to look after.
But does being of the same race guarantee parental fitness? The best
alternative for the child would have been to follow a course of action
that was least disruptive and one which promoted long-term
stability.232 The court, however, paid scant attention to the potential
harm that would result in severing the child's attachment to his foster
parents.233  It focused, instead, on hypothetical long-term racial
concerns and avoiding the "potentially tragic possibility of placing a
child in a home with parents who will not be able to cope with the
child's problems.' 234
The courts in the United States thus seem to have an ambivalent
approach towards race as a factor in adoption proceedings.235 They
have been somewhat content with the legal doctrine that race can be
one factor, an important factor, but not the determining factor in the
proceedings. Yet they have somehow failed to appreciate (or have
deliberately ignored) the fact that often race is the only issue at stake,
and while other competing concerns are considered, they inevitably
assume a secondary role.236 Race as a factor in the decision-making
consideration of physical characteristics necessarily carries with it
permission to consider racial characteristics. This Court does not have the
professional expertise to assess the wisdom of that type of inquiry, but it is
our province to conclude, as we do today, that the use of race as one of those
factors is not unconstitutional.
Id. at 1205-06.
230. Id. at 1205. The district court found:
[T]he consideration of race was properly directed to the best interest of the
child and was not an automatic-type of thing or of placement, that is, that all
blacks go to black families, all whites go to white families, and all mixed
children go to black families, which would be prohibited.
Id. at 1204.
231. Id.
232. See infra Part VI.
233. Drummond, 563 F.2d at 1204.
234. Id. at 1205.
235. See supra notes 158, 163, 174, 202, 215, and 223.
236. See also Angela T. McCormick, Transracial Adoption: A Critical View Of the
Courts' Present Standards, 28 J. FAM. L. 303 (1989-90). McCormick argues that the
principle that race can be a "relevant but not decisive" factor does not operate well in
practice. Id. The application of that principle permits courts to hide behind racially-
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process in other areas of the law is impermissible.2 This is part of
the anti-discrimination ethic in the United States. Although the courts
favor a mixing of the races in general, they are not always supportive
of the practice in family life.238 Where adoptive families are
concerned, one court stated, "It is a natural thing for children to be
raised by parents of their same ethnic background., 239 Further, in the
absence of a specific statutory check-list of factors that must be
considered, the best interests test provides the courts with substantial
discretion to consider, and even overemphasize, race in the placement
process, provided it is within the parameters of what is constitutionally
permitted.
Thus the endorsement of racial-matching policies by the courts
indicates their predilection, at times, for creating a racially-similar,
nearly biological, adoptive family. For example, by stating that this is
~,,140
an effort toward a "normal family relationship, the majority in
Drummond seemed to imply an abnormality in mixed-race families or,
at any event, in transracial adoption. It is indeed curious why racial-
matching policies have been tolerated at a time when efforts are being
made at all levels to harmonize relations between races and to promote
integration, not separatism. A plausible explanation is that the issue is
simply not important enough. The problems that center around a
vulnerable group of minority children and those interested in caring for
them do not merit a campaign for ending these harmful practices.241
Though some might view such issues as being socially and politically
insignificant, they are also a troubling indicator of race relations and
the true picture of racial tolerance in our society when racial boundaries
are spanned or blurred. More importantly, in the context of adoption,
it is indeed questionable as to whose best interests are being served.242
biased decisions. McCormick therefore proposes a three-part, arguably cumbersome,
examination which is meant to ensure accountability when courts consider race in child
placement decisions. Id. at 315-17.
237. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
238. See supra notes 163-214 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court held that
anti-miscegenation statutes were unconstitutional 13 years after it ruled on the
unconstitutionality of segregation in the public school system. "The law reflected the
primal importance to a segregated society of maintaining racial separation in the
context of the family." Bartholet, Politics of Race Matching, supra note 1, at 1176.
239. Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't of Family & Children's Servs., 563 F.2d
1200, 1205 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 910 (1978).
240. Id. at 1205-06 (emphasis added).
241. Bartholet, Politics of Race Matching, supra note 1, at 1242-43.
242. See supra notes 124-29 and accompanying text.
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V. LEGAL CONCERNS IN BRITAIN
A. Legislative Lacuna
There are no racial-matching statutes in Britain comparable to the
legislation in the United States.243 Section six of the Adoption Act
1976 states that when making any decision concerning a child's
adoption, a court or adoption agency must consider all the
circumstances, "first consideration being given to the need to
safeguard and promote the welfare of the child throughout his
childhood. ' 244 There is, however, no check-list of factors in the
statute to be considered in determining the child's best interests. The
Children Act 1989, which amends the Adoption Act in part, also does
not make any specific reference to racial or cultural issues concerning a
child in its section 1(3) check-list. In any event, even if sections
l(3)(b)-(d) of the Children ActP 45 were considered broad enough to
encompass those concerns, for adoption purposes, guidance
concerning the child's welfare must be sought from the 1976 Act, not
the Children Act.241
Many local authorities and adoption agencies in England are partial
to racial-matching practices, although any rigid policy which fetters
their discretionary powers would almost certainly be subject to judicial
review. For some time now, the BAAF has had in effect a policy
which advocates that a child should be raised by parents of the same
ethnic and racial group, unless there is an unacceptable delay in
achieving this.247 In 1990, the Chief Inspector of the Social Services
243. See generally Adoption: The Future 1993, London HMSO, Cm 2288
[hereinafter, White Paper]
244. Adoption Act 1976, ch. 36, § 6 (Eng.). Parker argues that this formulation of
the best interests principle is "weaker" than the standard which requires the best
interests of the child to be "paramount" in any decision. Parker, supra note 121, at 27.
Arguably, this wording is a recognition of the competing interests.
245. The Children Act 1989, ch. 41 § l(3)(b) (Eng.), refers to the "child's physical,
emotional and educational needs;" § 1(3)(c) refers to the "likely effect on him of any
change in circumstances;" and § l(3)(d) considers the child's "background and any
characteristics of his which the court considers relevant," all of which could be relevant
to the racial, cultural and status quo issues that arise in transracial adoption matters. The
Children Act 1989, ch. 41, § 1(3)(b-d). Section 22(5)(c) of The Children Act permits
race as a factor to be taken into "due consideration" in relation to children in local
authority care. The Children Act 1989, ch. 41 § 22(5)(c). See also Hayes, supra note
29, at 3 (correctly arguing that "due consideration" has been "wilfully misinterpreted to
mean 'paramount consideration,"' which results in some authorities prohibiting
transracial placements, while others strictly screen white parents) (citations omitted).
246. See Mears, supra note 102, at 564.
247. White, supra note 107, at 1308. See also Re N, [1990] 1 FLR 58, 62 (noting
that British agencies forcefully expressed that black children should never be placed
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Inspectorate provided guidelines on issues of race and culture in the
family placement of children.248 Although the advice provided is
meant to impart a well-rounded approach concerning the welfare of a
child, the emphasis is on same-race placements:
[Ilt may be taken as a guiding principle of good practice that,
other things being equal and in the great majority of cases,
placement with a family of similar ethnic origin and religion is
most likely to meet a child's needs as fully as possible and to
safeguard his or her welfare most effectively.249
In 1993, a White Paper entitled Adoption: The Future250 was issued
after a substantive review of adoption laws, including the practice of
transracial adoption. The White Paper states that although the
Adoption Act 1976 makes no reference to issues of ethnicity or
culture, in practice, local authorities and adoption agencies have taken
such factors into account and have given them disproportionate
importance. "[I]n some cases it is clear that those assessing parents
may have given these factors an unjustifiably decisive influence and
failed to make a balanced overall judgment of the parents'
suitability. ' 25' The White Paper further states that:
There is no conclusive research which justifies isolating such
questions from other matters needing assessment; or which
supports the proposition that children adopted by people of a
different ethnic group will necessarily encounter problems of
identity or prejudice later in life.252
The White Paper clearly provides that even though issues such as a
child's ethnicity and cultural needs are relevant, they are among other
issues that need to be considered but should not necessarily be more
important. Further, the White Paper affirms that the most important
factor in assessing prospective adoptive parents is their ability to assist
and support children through all the difficulties and challenges they
might face in life, "not just any risk of difficulty attributable to ethnic
background., 253 The White Paper also attempts to put racial issues
into perspective, emphasizing that they are part of the overall concerns
with white foster parents).
248. Letter No. C1(90)2, Jan. 29, 1990, A6/99.
249. Id. at A6/101. Arguably, this "guiding principle" cannot result in "good
practice" if children are kept in institutions or impermanent foster care homes in
furtherance of that principle.
250. White Paper, supra note 243.
251. Id. at 4.32, at 9.
252. Id. at 1 4.33, at 9.
253. Id. at 1 4.34, at 9. The White Paper has, however, been criticized for promoting
an ideal family idealogy. See Simon Jolly & R. Sandland, Political Correctness and the
Adoption White Paper, [1994] FAM. LAw 30, 31-32.
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and the balancing exercise and do not necessarily merit more
importance than any other factor.
B. Courting Race
1. Is Race the Case?
In Re P (A Minor)(Adoption),254 the Court of Appeal affirmed the
deputy High Court judge's decision in wardship proceedings which
ordered the transfer of a mixed-race baby (then sixteen months old)
from white foster parents to prospective black adoptive parents. 5
The local council had clearly adopted the policy of racial matching,
reflecting "national guide-lines" in which "the key feature was that,
where possible, every child should be brought up by a family of the
same race and ethnic group. "256 The policy was developed by the local
council's witnesses in evidence, which included the statement of the
team manager of the council's family placement team "that a mixed-
race child was seen as black in society.,, 25" Thus, despite the fact that
the foster mother had provided excellent care for the child and she was
the only "mother" he had ever known, she was rejected as a
prospective adoptive parent solely on the grounds of race. 258 The
judge at first instance accepted the benefits of placing a mixed-race
child in a black or mixed-race family and concluded that it was in the
child's best interests to integrate as soon as possible into the new
family selected by the council .2 9 The foster mother appealed on the
grounds, inter alia, that the judge had incorrectly carried out the
balancing exercise. She claimed that, on the facts of the case, the risk
to the child's stability, by removing him from the only home known to
him, far outweighed the other relevant factors.26°
The Court of Appeal stated that it was bound by precedent. 26' Thus,
the court was unable to intervene unless the judge's decision was so
obviously wrong that the only legitimate conclusion was that he had
254. [1990] FAM. LAW 66.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. See G v. G [1985] 1 WLR 647, 647. It is argued that this "'principle' [of being
bound to precedent], however, is rightly seen as, in practice, little more than a sham,
being easily circumvented in any particular case where the Court of Appeal actually
wishes to allow an appeal." Mears, supra note 102, at 564.
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erred in the exercise of his discretion.262 Although the court referred to
the so-called "national guidelines," it did not actually comment on them
or on the council's policy towards transracial adoptions. 263 Further,
the court declined to comment on whether its decision would have
been the same; it simply could not state that the judge had been plainly
wrong.26" Be that as it may, the case illustrates the rigid application of
a misplaced social policy that, in practice, gives first consideration to
the child's race and not necessarily the overall welfare. The confident
manner in which anticipated, hypothetical problems in the future
concerning racial identity are presented and accepted is indeed
mystifying. It is also puzzling how the zeal to racially match children
with strangers is in their best interests, even though the child is well
settled and even if it means severing ties that will cause great harm.
2. Racial Equipoise
In Re N (A Minor)(Adoption),265 the foster parents of a child who
was born to unmarried Nigerian parents applied to adopt her and for
leave to dispense with the natural mother's consent on the basis that it
was being withheld unreasonably.266 The father, a naturalized
American citizen, made an application in wardship for care and control
of the child and for leave to take her out of the jurisdiction.267 He was
supported by the natural mother in this action. Both the foster parents'
and the father's applications were heard together.268
The judge addressed the politically and racially-fraught issue of
transracial adoption in a sensible and robust manner. He sought to
strike a balance between the traumatic impact on the child if she were
moved from her foster parents, with whom she had developed very
262. G v. G [1985] 1 WLR at 647
263. See White, supra note 107, at 1312. White states that the Court of Appeal
seemed to place emphasis on the evidence provided in the case that a mixed race child is
considered as black in society, which he argues suggests that black adoptive parents are
more suitable to assist the child in dealing with racism. Id. However, White continues
that this "seems to be a personal perception not borne out by the experience of some.
What if a child has a particular religious background? Catholics might regard their
religious upbringing as more important than the color of the skin." Id.
264. Id. at 1308.
265. Re N (A Minor) (Adoption) [1990] 1 FLR 58.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id. In hearing these cases together, the court stated that in adoption it should
give due consideration to a child's wishes and feelings regarding the adoption as far as it
can be ascertained and with regard to the age and understanding of the child. Id. at 59.
However, in wardship proceedings, "the first and paramount consideration is the welfare
of the child." Id.
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strong emotional ties over the four and one-half years of her life, and
the effect of an adoption order on the natural father.269 Adoption is an
alien practice in Nigerian society; an adoption order would thus have
shamed and distressed him and had a resulting impact on the child.
Further, the natural father would have an important role to play in the
child's future, when she would probably inquire about her cultural and
ethnic background.2' Thus, in balancing those factors against the
stability an adoption order would provide the child, the judge
concluded that the wardship should continue, with care and control to
the foster parents and reasonable access, to be agreed on, to the
father.27
The judge clearly did not subscribe to the dogmatic attitude that is
often assumed by race-matching proponents. 273 "The mischief that an
unquestioning application of this approach has engendered has been
clear to this Division of the High Court for some time;" "the emphasis
on colour rather than cultural upbringing can be mischievous and
highly dangerous when you are dealing in practical terms with the
welfare of children. '274 The judge referred to the various theories
concerning ethnicity, identity and the need for "black" children to
develop "survival skills" in black families. 5 He stated that other than
anecdotal evidence, there was little proof that black children from
white backgrounds struggle with racism and that such placements are
harmful. 6 The judge also referred to the absurd devotion to ideology
and color-coordinated schemes which local authorities tended to rely
on in advocating racial matching.2 7 Although the judge acknowledged
269. Id. Although the father had gone to see his daughter in England, "there was not
very much progress so far as getting the child to know or accept the father. . . . [O]ver
the 4 1/2 years the father has had about 18 hours in the child's company." Id. at 61. On
the other hand, the father had difficulty in obtaining a United States visa for his daughter
and always kept in contact with the foster parents and sent them money and clothing for
support. Id. at 60.
270. Id. at 64.
271. Id.
272. Id. Because of the particular circumstances of the case, the judge did not think it
right to grant the adoption. Id. at 68.
273. The judge stated that the natural father:
does not have to be condescended to because he is black .... To suggest that
he and his children need special help because they are black is, in human
terms, an insult to them and their abilities. Yet it is to this principle that a
whole social work philosophy has been dedicated.
Id. at 63 (emphasis added).
274. Id.
275. Id. at 62.
276. Id.
277. Id. The court added, "I have only to cite this doctrine to show the ridiculous
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that a child should, if at all possible, be brought up by her natural
parents, this had to be balanced with the severe psychological
problems which would arise if this child were moved from the only
caregivers she had ever known.2 7 8 The welfare of the child, her
future, and individual well being had to be considered before any order
could be made by the court.2
79
The court in Re N properly considered the child's best interest. The
natural father had not spent more than eighteen hours with the child
during the four and one-half years of her life.28° She, understandably,
was very reluctant to leave her foster parents for a person who,
although her natural father and thus racially suited, was in reality a
stranger. 28' Although racial, cultural, and competing issues were
considered, the factors were balanced sensibly, without the social and
political hysteria that has often accompanied the matter.282
In Re JK (Adoption: Transracial Placement), 3 the foster parents of
a three year old Sikh girl who was born out of wedlock, and had been
placed with them since her birth, sought to adopt her.284 The local
authority had, however, considered the placement to be short-term,
and, in accordance with their racial-matching policy (based on guide-
lines), wanted to place her with racially-similar adoptive parents. 285 It
was unlikely that the local authority would find such a family, as
adoption in the Sikh community is extremely rare, unless the
placement is with a blood relative.286
nature of a dedication to dogma." Id.
278. Id. at 63.
279. Id. at 59.
280. Id. at 61.
281. Id.
282. See Re 0 (Transracial Adoption: Contact), [1996] 1 FLR 540. Thorpe J. tried to
balance the competing issues in a factually complicated case. Id. White foster parents
were permitted to adopt a Nigerian child who had been placed with them for a period of
four years from the age of seven. Id. The judge, however, also permitted the child to
have contact with her Nigerian mother as there were potential benefits for the child in
developing this relationship. Id. See also Mears, supra note 102, at 565 (questioning
how her best interests could possibly have been promoted had she been raised in the
black community, "surrounded by race relations enthusiasts assuring her that she was
destined to be a lifelong victim of unfriendly people operating a bigoted system").
283. Re JK (Adoption Transracial Placement) [1991] 2 FLR 340.
284. Id. at 344.
285. Id. at 342. In this case, the local authority considered children of Asian
background to fall under their policy on fostering and adoption of black children. Id. at
341.
286. Id. It is especially uncommon when the child's mother is unmarried, due to the
concomitant stigma which attaches. Id. The social services department had attempted to
find a suitable adoptive family from 63 different agencies. Id.
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The child was very fond of her foster parents and had
psychologically "bonded" with them.287 She was well adjusted and
looked after, but the local authority still wanted to move her to a
bridging family in order to weaken the ties between the foster mother
and the child until such time as an appropriate adoptive family had
been selected. 28 ' The foster parents thus issued wardship proceedings
for the child to remain a ward during her minority and for care and
control to be granted to them until further order.289 The local authority
applied for a care order with leave to place her with long-term foster
parents with a view to adoption.zg
The child's welfare was the first consideration. The Official
Solicitor, who represented the child, obtained a detailed report from an
experienced child psychiatrist that firmly stated that if the child were
moved at that stage from the only home she had ever known, it would
probably cause her irreparable psychological damage.29' She would
not likely trust people again and would almost certainly spurn any new
"parents. 292 The judge thus had to balance the competing concerns
and consider whether the child should, at the age of three, be taken
away from her foster parents, and the only parents she had known all
her life. Although the judge stated that "this case raises in some degree
the sensitive issue of so-called transracial adoption, the general
principle is not the prime issue in these proceedings., 293 Arguably the
question of transracial placements was intrinsic to a decision that
served the child's best interests.
The foster parents were considered good, short-term caregivers, and
had made an effort to help the child assimilate and identify with her
ethnic background. 294 They had taken her on a weekly basis to a Sikh
temple in the area. Further, they lived in a community that
accommodated different racial groups and had schools which children
287. Id.
288. Id. at 343. Although the local authority had not been able to find an appropriate
adoptive family for three years, they felt it necessary to remove the child from her foster
home and place her in a temporary home to weaken the bonds so that the transition to an
adoptive family, when they finally identified one, would be easier. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 344. In his report, the child psychiatrist stated the issue as "whether
there should be a decision to leave the child in her present home and to set in process an
adoption procedure for the foster-parents, or whether she should be removed, because of
her racial and cultural background, to an as yet unidentified family." Id.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 346.
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of varied racial, especially Asian, backgrounds attended.2 95 The foster
parents stated, and the judge accepted, that if the child remained in
their care, they would make an effort to help the child maintain contact
with her ethnic background and would seek assistance in dealing with
this matter.296 Further, and of great significance, was the fact that the
natural mother supported the placement with the foster parents.297 She
recognized the near impossibility of placing a child born out of
wedlock with a Sikh family, and she wanted a permanent placement
for her child.
The court ordered the wardship to be continued and for the child to
be committed to the care of the local authority.298 The child would
thus be placed with the foster parents with a view to adoption by them,
and they were granted leave to commence the adoption procedure.299
Clearly it was in the child's best interest, as the judge believed, to
maintain the status quo and consolidate the sense of stability that had
been developed over the three years of her life. Arguably the case also
illustrates the willingness of some local authorities to go to extreme
lengths to put into effect racial-matching policies. The disruption upon
being moved, first to a bridging family and later to another foster or
adoptive family, would only have harmed the child-how could that
possibly be justified as being in her best interest? If psychological
'bonding' and ties are evaluated as only one of the several factors in
the balancing process, then race should be accorded similar
consideration. There was no certainty of locating a racially-suitable
family that would nurture her Sikh and racial identity any more than
her foster parents had, let alone the impossibility of ever finding a Sikh
adoptive family.
3. The Reasonable Use of Race?
The Court of Appeal in R v. Lancashire County Council ex parte
M300 dismissed the renewed application for judicial review made by the
foster parents of a mixed-race child.30' The local authority had placed
the child with them on a short-term basis, but the foster parents, who
had provided excellent care, were interested in adopting the child.0 2
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id. at 347.
298. Id. at 348.
299. Id.
300. [1992] 1 FLR 109.
301. Id. at 114.
302. Id. at 111.
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The local authority rejected their application and found prospective
adopters who had already been placed with two mixed-race
children. °3 The foster parents initially commenced wardship
proceedings, which were later discharged.3 4 Meanwhile, the child
was removed from their care and placed with the prospective adopters
with whom he remained. The foster parents then applied for leave to
seek judicial review of the local authority's decision, which was
dismissed.0 5 Their renewed application included the claim that no
reasonable local authority would make the decision to remove the child
from their care and place him with a different family.3°'
During the course of the abandoned wardship proceedings, the local
authority had prepared an unsworn affidavit which substantiated their
reasons for moving the child and which also affirmed that they had
considered all the relevant competing concerns before coming to a
decision. They maintained that the child's mixed racial background
would become increasingly important with the passage of time.
However, they were uncertain about the foster parents' ability to deal
with issues such as racial and cultural identity as the child grew
older.3"7
Although the new "parents" were white, they had already adopted
two mixed-race children who were well adjusted and happy, and the
two children were well aware of their ethnicity, which had been openly
discussed.30 8 Further, the child's natural mother lived in the vicinity
and knew of her child's whereabouts. The judge sympathized with the
foster parents, but the local authority had apparently not rigidly applied
a policy of racial matching and had not acted unreasonably.
30 9
303. Id. The court noted that the family chosen by the local authority were also
white, "from the same sort of area and provide[d] no higher or better level of care" than
the foster family. Id. The only significant difference was that the approved adoptive
family had two mixed-race children. Id.
304. Id. at 110.
305. Id.
306. Id. at 111. The petitioners contended that "there was never any criticism by the
local authority of [them] in respect of their physical or emotional care of D, of their love
for him or his for them." Id.
307. Id. at 112. In the authority's report about the foster parent, they stated "[the
foster parents] do not accept that colour is significant and do not see D as a different
race/colour. . . . [the applicants'] general attitude does not bode well for them coping
with issues of cultural and racial identity as D grows older." Id. at 113.
308. Id.
309. Id. Although the judge sympathized with the foster parents, he stated:
(W]e have to apply the law and the law requires. . . . for judicial review,
certainly in this case, that we should not grant leave unless we consider there
is a reasonable prospect . . . that the local authority's conclusion, bearing in
mind its statutory duties, was so unreasonable that no reasonable local
1996]
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Further, the application for judicial review was made after the child
had been removed from their care, and he had spent time with his new
"parents". 310
The Court of Appeal thus refused to grant the foster parents leave on
the basis that it was implausible that a court would conclude that the
local authority's decision, in light of its statutory duties, was so
unreasonable that no reasonable local authority could come to it. It
was not for the court to delineate what it would have done in the same
situation; in these judicial review proceedings the court had to ascertain
whether the local authority's actions could be considered perverse. In
light of all the evidence, the foster parents' application had to be
denied.31'
The case is interesting in that the child was apparently not moved to
a family in compliance with a rigid racial-matching policy that sought
to create an ethnically similar social unit. On the contrary, the new
"parents" were white, though they had adopted two mixed-race
children who were, it was said, ethnically well adjusted. Presumably
this indicated a healthy, "correct" attitude in the family towards
sensitive, racial matters. Although the local authority had expressed
concern that the foster parents might not be able to cope with racial and
cultural issues that could arise later, these were hypothetical difficulties
and might equally have posed a problem for the new family." 2 The
foster parents were said to have a "colour blind" approach, 3, 3 were
obviously aware of the child's mixed parentage, and thus were plainly
willing to assume the responsibility of a transracial placement. It
seems that the local authority did not evaluate that asset fairly or
consider the impact of a new placement, albeit permanent, on the child.
Undoubtedly their decision was not so unreasonable that no reasonable
authority would have come to it. But in elevating the status and
importance of race, had they in any way fettered their discretion?
Further, by relying on the possibility of "problems" that could arise in
the future, but had as yet no empirical basis, had the authority taken
irrelevant considerations into account? By ignoring the excellent care
and stability provided by the foster parents, had the local authority
discounted relevant considerations? More importantly, whether their
decision actually served the child's best interests is questionable.
authority could ever have come to it.
Id.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Id.
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In Re P (A Minor)(Removal of Child for Adoption),314 the local
authority, in accordance with a care plan which placed children for
adoption with same-race parents, sought to institute proceedings to
remove a twenty-one month old girl of Afro-Caribbean descent from
her white foster parents.1 5 She had been placed with them since birth,
and the foster parents wished to adopt her. There was no doubt that
she had formed a significant attachment to her foster parents, and the
local authority stressed that it had no criticism of the love and care they
had provided for her.316 The couple had previously adopted a mixed-
race child who at the time of the hearing was twelve years old.317
Although the local authority accepted the foster parents as potential
adopters, they felt that the child's long-term interests were best
promoted by a placement with a black family.31 8  Further, they
maintained that although they did not have a rigid racial-matching
policy, the importance of a long-term, same-race placement had to be
balanced against the importance of the strength of the ties that the child
may have formed in her present placement.319
A sensible course of action was outlined by the child psychiatrist.
The child needed a permanent, stable home and severing ties with the
foster parents would only harm her.32° If the foster parents were
allowed to adopt her, they could seek advice and benefit from the
assistance provided by post-adoption support agencies.3 2' The fact
that the foster parents had raised a mixed-race child provided support
for their ability to deal with problems that might arise from a transracial
placement.322
314. [1994] 2 FCR 537.
315. The local authority had, under §§ 30, 31 of the Adoption Act 1976, made an
application for leave to serve a notice on the foster parents of their intention to remove
the child. Id. at 537. The local authority stated that if they were granted leave, they
would not serve the notice immediately, and perhaps would not serve it at all. Id. They
hoped that the foster parents would continue to care for the child until a racially-suitable
adoptive family was identified, and a placement was made. Id. at 538.
3 16. Id. at 540. The court stressed the fact that the local authority had never
criticized the love and care given by the foster parents. Id.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Id. at 541. The authority maintained that although the race of a child and the
prospective adoptive parents is a significant factor in these cases, it is balanced with the
"degree and strength of any attachment which the child may have formed elsewhere." Id.
320. Id. at 542. The child psychiatrist specifically stated that the child would "suffer
significant harm if removed now." Id.
321. Id.
322. Id. at 543. The child psychiatrist testified that, "to remove her from a secure and
loving home on the theoretical assumption that she may in the future run into difficuties
is against all good child care practice." Id.
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The judge, too, stressed the importance of stability and continuity in
this young girl's life and was concerned that any change would cause
her both short-term and long-term harm.323 The court thus refused the
local authority's application for leave to serve a notice on the foster
parents and maintained that an early hearing of the foster parents'
adoption application was the best way forward.324
Although the local authority stated that it did not pursue a rigid
racial-matching policy,3 25 the fact that it was willing to find another
short-term foster care family for the girl until they had identified a
racially-suitable family must call its statement into question. The fact
that these repeated disruptions would be harmful for the child and that
her best interests would be far from served apparently were secondary
matters to the authority's racial-matching policy. The judge should
have made some reference to the harm that results from the relentless
pursuit of such a rigid policy, which although denied, was clearly in
operation in this case.
Thus the concerns that are predominant in cases in the United States
often have constitutional foundations: denial of due process and equal
protection of the law, Fourteenth Amendment violations, and issues
affecting civil rights.326 Further, American judges have tried to
address racial matters in adoption with varying degrees of success and
consistency, and although they have kept constitutional parameters in
mind, they have not always analyzed whether, and to what extent, race
is a constitutionally permitted factor in the best interests framework.327
In Britain, concerned parties do not contest racial-matching policies
by asserting the Bill of Rights, rule of law, Race Relations Act of
1976 or constitutional guarantees to equal protection.328 In the absence
of a "written" constitution, like the United States Constitution, local
British authorities are brought to task and made accountable by the
process of judicial review by invoking the jurisdiction of the Court 32 9
or by making a complaint about the local authority through its internal
complaints procedure. 330 The absence of constitutional limitations in
323. Id. To disrupt that attachment would be extremely detrimental. Id.
324. Id. at 544.
325. Id. at 541.
326. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
327. See supra note 235 and accompanying text.
328. See supra text accompanying notes 235-38.
329. To invoke this jurisdiction, an application must be made to the High Court.
Supreme Court Act, 1981, ch. 54, Sch. 1, 1 3(b)(ii) (Eng.), amended by the Children Act,
1989, ch. 41, Sch. 13, 1 45(3) (Eng.).
330. Children Act, 1989, ch. 41, § 26(3) (Eng.). See also National Health Service
and Community Care Act, 1990, ch. 19, § 50 (Eng.) (informing the Secretary of State
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Britain seems to permit the judges to keep the main aim of satisfying
the child's best interest in mind, while deliberating, not always
thoroughly, the concerns that emanate from transracial adoption or
rigid racial-matching policies. Thus, even though the underlying
issues concerning transracial adoptions and racial-matching policies in
both countries are similar, the case law analysis is inevitably different
given the dissimilar constitutional mandates.331 In both jurisdictions,
there has at times been excessive emphasis on hypothetical issues
332 btconcerning race. In both countries, the practice of transracial
adoption remains highly charged and controversial, the adoption forum
simply operating as another means of litigating divisive social and
political issues.
VI. CONCLUSION
"Indeed, the evidence is so overwhelmingly in favor of transracial
adoption that one must wonder whether the best interests of the child
are really everyone's concern. 333 The best interests objective is often
made more difficult when factors such as race, and the accompanying
political, social, and economic influences are included, either overtly
or as part of a hidden agenda. 334 The issues become more complex
when constitutional restrictions and ambiguous and ineffective statutes
regulate the area.
Unfortunately, the political, social, and legal influences that
frequently surround the issue of transracial adoption have obscured the
fact that the exercise relating to adoption decisions is for the child's
benefit and not an attempt to obliterate the individuality of different
races. The best interests test, which is an exercise that should function
as a multi-factor approach, often transforms into a one-factor
conclusion when race is included. Racial-matching policies
consistently isolate just one factor in that test - the child's ethnic
about the social service functions of local authorities, and the proper procedures to be
followed when a complaint arises against local authorities). See also P.M. BROMLEY &
N.V. LOWE, BROMLEY'S FAMILY LAW 545-47 (8th ed. 1992) (explaining the courts'
reluctance to use their jurisdictional power to challenge decisions of local authorities).
331. Hayes, supra note 29, at 19. In both countries, however, opponents of
transracial adoption have tried to frame their legal deliberations in psychological terms,
arguing about the "need" for an ethnic identity, and they have sensibly tried to refrain
from allowing the more radical and political arguments from entering into their legal
discussions. Id.
332. There also is a lack of consistency in the recommendations made by social
workers and in judicial decisions in general.
333. Lythcott-Haims, supra note 96, at 552-53.
334. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
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identity - and decisions are made solely on that basis, regardless of
the individual circumstances of a particular child. Thus, some argue
that race as a factor in the adoption process should be entirely
eliminated.335
Professionals and social workers almost unanimously agree that
children should be raised by racially-similar parents, if at all
possible.336 However, the inclusion of race in the placement process
eliminates other considerations and seems to result in race being the
determining factor.337 If in other areas of community life, including
family matters, we persistently advocate a nonpartisan system, why
are adoption and foster care singled out for mandating same-race
preferences? 3
38
Understandably a racially-neutral system poses difficulties. But is
there a suitable or appropriate body that can decide the correct racial
composition of an adoptive family? Past experiences and practices
have resulted in racial segregation that has operated to the detriment of
innocent children for whom the system is meant to provide. Thus in
the United States, children are kept in institutional care or moved
through foster homes until a racially-suitable family is identified.
Similarly, in Britain, children are kept in local authority care or moved
from foster parents to prevent a transracial placement, with little
thought given to the devastating impact on the child which results from
disrupting often the only family the child has ever known.
As it is, adoption is a second-best alternative for children whose
birth families cannot provide them with a suitable upbringing.339
Whenever children's relations with the adults who care for them are
disrupted, it is traumatic, whatever their age. "Adopted children of
necessity face one such disruption.,,3' ° Those who oppose transracial
adoption must believe that their views are well intentioned and
designed to benefit the child and the community. But, in reality, their
practices hurt those they presumably most want to safeguard.
Organizations and authorities that are responsible for the welfare of
children must be made more accountable for their practices. Further, if
335. See generally Bartholet, Politics of Race Matching, supra note 1, at 1248
(arguing for the abandonment of current racial matching policies in adoption).
336. See SIMON & ALTSTEIN, TRANSRACIAL ADOPTEES, supra note 23, at 142.
337. See Bartholet, Politics of Race Matching, supra note 1, at 1240, 1248.
338. In the case of In re R.M.G., the dissenting judge, in supporting the trial court's
decision in favor of the same-race grandparents, concluded by stating that "[w]e must
live in the world as it is while we strive to make it as it should be." In re R.M.G., 454
A.2d 776, 810 (D.C. 1982) (emphasis original).
339. See White Paper, supra note 243, 4.5 at 6.
340. Id.
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prospective parents are included in the decision making process and
are guided in addressing the diverse and difficult issues that might
arise as a result of adopting a racially-different child, then some of the
tensions in permitting transracial adoption might be alleviated.34' If a
carefully selected family is able to provide a home for a child who is
ethnically dissimilar, it is irrational to erect racial obstacles. Further,
the allocation of funds to recruit families, and the provision of
subsidies and resources to those who wish to adopt and provide a
home for waiting children, might also be another way of addressing
some of the concerns.342 But to place a prohibition on all transracial
placements until we achieve desired social reforms will only result in
serious harm to those children who await homes at present. Children
should be freed from institutional care and the impermanence of foster
homes and placed with qualifying adoptive families, whatever their
racial origins, while concurrent efforts are made to include more
families in the system.
It is thus submitted that the practice of racial matching is harmful
when children are the victims of rigid policies which do not serve their
best interests and when it may only result in the perpetuation of racial
divisions in society. It is also an unrealistic attempt to form a
superficially similar family, futile because the family itself is changing
with the increasing number of step-families, artificial insemination,
and other developments which contradict this preference to have a
mirror-image social unit.343 Thus, even though the model nuclear
family seems to have disappeared, there is a great effort to recreate it in
the promotion of an ideal adoptive family based on racial similarity.
341. Bartholet, Politics of Race Matching, supra note 1, at 1253-54. See also
McRoY & ZURCHER, supra note 17, at 145 (suggesting that because adoption agencies
should recognize that their responsibilities do not end once the adoption is legally
finalized, the agencies should provide post-placement support services and recommend
support groups for parents and children in which concerns can be addressed with black
and white adoption workers and other families that have adopted transracially); see also
Mahoney, supra note 18, at 499 (suggesting that prospective adoptive parents should
have input in and guidance about the race of the child they are interested in adopting).
342. Howard, supra note 19, at 546; see also SIMON & ALTSTEIN, TRANSRACIAL
ADOPTION, supra note 20, at 165-79 (discussing subsidized adoptions); BAGLEY,
INTERNATIONAL AND TRANSRACIAL ADOPTIONS, supra note 43, at 326 (suggesting that
social workers should look to the extended family as a possible resource in the
temporary or permanent placement of children whose parents are unable to care for
them).
343. See Perry, supra note 5, at 97. See also The Disappearing Family, ECONOMIST,
Sept. 9, 1995, at 19 (discussing the breakdown of the family and the role of government
in it); Home Sweet Home, ECONOMIST, Sept. 9, 1995, at 25 (comparing governmental
family policies in America and Britain with those in Sweden and Germany).
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Those who advocate the practice seem to forget that there are many
competing interests in the adoption process other than nurturing a
child's racial identity, such as the compelling need for a child to have a
stable family and to be free from institutional homes and the transient
nature of foster care. Proponents of the practice of race matching, of
course, state that it is only in the child's best interest to have parents of
a racially-similar background. Nevertheless, it is submitted that a
bigoted perspective is harmful and it further prevents children from
reaching adoptive, permanent homes. The practice also ignores the
plight of biracial and multiracial children for whom an ideal "match" is
almost impossible.
If in providing homes and stability for children in need, transracial
adoption results in rigid racial and ethnic boundaries being crossed,
and if an effort is made to counter discrimination and separatism both
legally and socially, even in the most intimate of settings like the
family, then any policy or practice that attempts to recreate those
divisions must be strongly resisted. Such policies harm those they are
meant to benefit, and impede our commitment to ending racism and
promoting social integration.
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